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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT
TAX EXEMPTION
Philip T. Hackney*
Certain nonprofit organizations are granted exemption from federal
income   tax   (“tax   exemption”).   Most   theories   assume   tax   exemption is a
subsidy for organizations such as charities that provide some
underprovided good or service. To make the subsidy case, these theories
assume that there should be a tax on nonprofit organization income but
provide no justification for this assumption. This article contributes to the
literature by considering corporate income tax rationales as a proxy for
why we might tax nonprofit organizations. The primary two corporate tax
theories hold that the corporate tax is imposed to: (1) tax shareholders
(“shareholder   theory”),   and   (2)   regulate   corporate manager control over
large   sources   of   wealth   (“regulatory   theory”).   The   article   concludes   that  
under the shareholder theory, tax exemption for charitable organizations is
not a subsidy because such organizations have no shareholders to tax.
Nonetheless, tax exemption for mutual benefit organizations such as
business leagues qualifies as a subsidy because their members are arguably
the equivalent of shareholders. Adopting the regulatory theory suggests tax
exemption is a subsidy for all tax exempt organizations, as this rationale
should apply to any tax exempt organization with the potential to amass
significant wealth. Adopting this theory also suggests that to exempt an
organization from income tax is to exempt that organization from a
regulatory regime. Tax exempt organizations, however, become subject to
federal oversight of political activity and self-dealing transactions. This
article considers whether this separate regulatory regime is a sufficient
substitute. While this article concludes that the charitable organization
*
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regulatory regime is a sufficient substitute for the corporate income tax, it
also concludes that the regulatory regime for mutual benefits is lacking.
This article proposes that it is time to revamp our tax exempt structure for
mutual benefit organizations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Nonprofit organizations carry on economic activity within and without
our country like many other legally recognized entities that are required to
pay tax; nonprofit organizations, however, are generally exempted from
paying income tax.1 Most theories assume tax exemption, most typically
from the corporate income tax,2 is a subsidy for nonprofit organizations that
provide some good or service that benefits society or is otherwise underproduced.3 The subsidy presumption, however, is not grounded in a
1
Specifically, organizations exempted from the federal income tax under section
501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) include charitable organizations, social welfare
organizations, labor organizations, business leagues, social clubs, and many others. This
exemption is not the same as the charitable contribution deduction under section 170, which
is a separate and distinct issue that is available as a benefit to only a few of the organizations
that are exempt from tax under section 501(a). Although generally an organization exempt
under section 501(a) is not required to pay a tax on its income, if it carries on a trade or
business unrelated to its exempt purpose it must pay the unrelated business income tax under
section 511.
2
Most nonprofits exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) are formed as
corporations. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 38 (3d ed. 2010). The Code imposes a tax on the income of these nonprofit
organizations formed as corporations under section 11. Of course, exemption under section
501(a) is used to ensure exemption in a sense from the individual income tax as well under
section 1, as income earned in any activity could be attributed to an individual if that
individual does not have some credible claim that the income is associated with some entity
that is recognized for tax purposes. Some nonprofit organizations exempt under section
501(a) might be established as trusts (and become exempt from tax under subchapter J),
organized as cooperatives (and become exempt from tax under subchapter T), or organized
as unincorporated associations (and treated as corporations under section 7701).
3
See Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011); Rob Atkinson, Altruism
in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990) [hereinafter Altruism]; Rob
Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and
Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997) [hereinafter Theories of Exemption]; Boris I.
Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy:
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rationale for why we would tax the income of nonprofit organizations in the
first place. The subsidy rationale requires that in a normal income tax we
believe that an income tax should apply to these organizations. The subsidy
only results because the government forgoes tax revenue. This article
reframes the tax exemption rationale debate by considering the rationales
for imposing a corporate tax in our income tax system as a proxy for why
we might tax nonprofit entities. Focusing on the two major rationales of the
corporate   tax,   (1)   to   tax   shareholders   (“shareholder   theory”),   and   (2)   to  
regulate corporate manager control over large sources of wealth
(“regulatory   theory”),   this   article   examines   the   implications of those
theories for tax exemption. This article concludes that the corporate tax
rationale implications generally suggest that we have little rationale for
applying a corporate tax on the charitable activities of charitable
organizations; however, it recommends reconsidering tax exemption for
mutual benefit organizations such as social welfare organizations and
business leagues. The two primary rationales for imposing the corporate
income tax apply most specifically to the activities of mutual benefit
organizations.
Adopting the shareholder theory as a base for why we would tax a
nonprofit organization supports tax exemption for organizations without
shareholders. In fact, because charitable organizations have no
shareholders, this article argues that tax exemption is not a subsidy for such
organizations. On the other hand, mutual benefit organizations are operated
for the benefit of specific individuals or entities controlling the actions of
the organization through voting, i.e., mutual benefits arguably have
individuals akin to shareholders. Thus, under the shareholder theory,
because   a   tax   would   normally   apply   to   a   mutual   benefit’s   income,   tax  
exemption is a subsidy to mutual benefits. There are, as yet, no robust
arguments setting forth a positive rationale warranting the tax exemption of

Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); Nina J. Crimm, An
Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory
of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The
Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991) [hereinafter Nonprofit Hospitals]; Mark A. Hall & John D.
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379
(1991) [hereinafter Donative Theory]; Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011) [hereinafter Exemptions a Subsidy]; Daniel
Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133 (2006) [hereinafter
Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits]; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981); Lawrence M.
Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a
National Policy, 20 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 27 (1968).
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the vast majority of mutual benefits.4
Adopting the regulatory theory as a rationale for taxing corporate
entities supports a conclusion that tax exemption is a subsidy for all tax
exempt organizations, as by its terms the theory should apply to any
organization controlled by managers that might control significant sources
of wealth and over whom there is little oversight from owners. The
nonprofit sector by definition has weak ownership oversight. Nevertheless,
viewing tax exemption from the regulatory theory highlights that exempting
an organization from the corporate income tax exempts that organization
from a form of regulation. Tax exempt organizations become subject to a
new regulatory regime that limits political activity and self-dealing.5 This
article examines the impact of this substitution of regulatory regime; it
concludes the regulatory regime imposed on charitable organizations is
sufficient, but contends that the regulatory regime for mutual benefits is
lacking. This article suggests it is time to revamp our tax exempt structure
for mutual benefit tax exempt organizations.
Mutual benefit organizations such as business leagues and social
welfare organizations are often used to impact the political process.6 The
modern conception of the regulatory function suggests that the corporate
tax serves to reign in the political strength of corporate managers and to
direct managers towards using the assets of the corporation for more
socially desirable purposes.7 While the regulatory function of the corporate
tax is perhaps controversial,8 there can be no doubt that exempting an
4

But cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring)   (describing   the   “role   played   by   tax   exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed
often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints.”);; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3
(suggesting that some of the efforts of mutual benefits might be justifiable as exempt on the
theory that they might do the activity itself on their own without having to pay a tax);
Hansmann, supra note 3. Developing a theory of subsidizing the most efficient provider of a
service, described below in Part II, could potentially support some mutual benefits, though
Hansmann noted at least its inapplicability in the case of social clubs. Id.
5
Tax exempt organizations are subject to a regulatory regime under the Code. Among
other things, these organizations must annually comply with the requirements for qualifying
under section 501(c), and almost all of them must file an information return under section
6033, disclosing a significant amount of information regarding their activities each year.
They must make the information available to the public. Additionally there are prohibitions
on their involvement with the political process. See infra Part V.C.1.
6
See, e.g., Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call it
Public Welfare, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2012, 11:25 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/
how-nonprofits-spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare.
7
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1211–12 (2004).
8
See, e.g., STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT XVII (2010).
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organization from the tax limits the power of Congress over the
organization. For instance, Congress loses the ability to provide incentives
to tax exempt organizations through deductions from taxes. Congress has
responded in part to this need for a regulatory function over tax exempt
entities by limiting in part the political activities of exempt organizations
through prohibitions,9 imposing public disclosure requirements,10 and
applying some taxes.11 This article contends those efforts do not go far
enough for mutual benefit organizations. It proposes imposing a greater tax
burden on mutual benefit organizations, such as requiring them to pay a tax
on their investment income, to both properly apply a tax burden on
individuals who are shareholders and to properly tax the fullness of the
political activities of these organizations.
The recent scandal involving the Internal Revenue Service (Service)
exempt organizations division allegedly targeting Tea Party applicants for
extra scrutiny for tax exempt status12 also suggests a strong need for a
rethinking of our tax exemption system for mutual benefit tax exempt
organizations. The Tea Party organizations primarily appear to have sought
status as social welfare organizations under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), a type of organization that arguably fits under the
mutual benefit organization rubric; such organizations tend to be more
focused on member interests than they are in fulfilling some public need.
Social welfare organizations are allowed to intervene in a political
campaign   as   long   as   that   is   not   the   organization’s   primary purpose.13
Determining  whether  a  social  welfare  organization’s  primary  purpose  is  not  
political turns out to be a challenging exercise, as the Tea Party scandal
clearly illuminates.14 If we were to impose a net-investment income tax on
9
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (limiting charitable organizations from intervening in a
political campaign or engaging in lobbying that is more than a substantial part of its
activities).
10
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6033 (requiring organizations to file an annual return, made
publicly available, supplying substantial information regarding the activity of tax exempt
organizations).
11
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 527, 4911.
12
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, REF. NO. 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX
EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013).
13
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a) (as amended in 1990).
14
See, e.g., Stephen Ohlemacher, Holly Paz, IRS Supervisor, Admits Scrutinizing
Applications From Tea Party Groups, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2013, 8:08 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/16/irs-scandal-holly-paz-tea-party-applications_
n_3451684.html (quoting a statement Holly Paz, then Director of the Internal Revenue
Service’s (Service) Rulings and Agreements division, made to investigators: “[The 501(c)(4)
political determination is] very fact-and-circumstance intensive. So  it’s  a  difficult  issue.”).
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all mutual benefit organizations, as this article proposes, we would take a
great deal of pressure off of the Service in making this political call.
Additionally, requiring public disclosure of donors to most mutual benefit
tax exempt organizations would be a beneficial move to make the
requirements for such potentially politically active organizations more in
line with the requirements of a section 527 political organization that
already lives under such a requirement.15
Our tax system employs a number of different forms of taxation for
various legal entities, such as trusts,16 cooperatives,17 partnerships,18 and a
host of special industry taxation systems such as insurance and banking.19
Thus, in considering a basis for imposing an income tax on a nonprofit
organization, one might begin by asking: why focus on corporate tax
rationales to the exclusion of other entity tax systems? The first answer is
practical: the vast majority of organizations we exempt from tax are formed
as corporations.20 Thus, while there may be some benefit to a consideration
of trust-based or cooperative-based tax rationales, without exemption, most
organizations that would have qualified as exempt would be responsible for
the corporate income tax.21 Furthermore, in structure, nonprofit
organizations look much like our large publicly traded corporations where
there is a separation between firm ownership and management.22 There are
no   “owners”   of   a   nonprofit   organization;;   consequently   we   cannot   use   a  
pass-through taxation system like we do for partnerships where it is clear
who owns the firm. Therefore, in a nonprofit context, a first order

15

I.R.C. § 527(j).
Trusts are taxed under subchapter J of Title A of the Code.
17
Cooperatives are generally taxed under subchapter T of Title A of the Code.
18
Partnerships are taxed under subchapter K of Title A of the Code.
19
Insurance companies and banks are taxed under subchapters L and H of Title A of
the Code, respectively.
20
See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 52. Also, on an anecdotal level, a review
of the Form 990 of each organization listed in the Top Ten Nonprofit Charitable
Organizations, by Size of Total Assets, Tax Year 2008, a collection of organizations holding
over $186 billion dollars, shows that each of these organizations formed as a corporation.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: CHARITIES & OTHER TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11esgiftsnap.pdf (last visited
July 3, 2013).
21
Of course, even if subject to tax this does not mean that all of these organizations
would owe tax. A nonprofit that receives donations to carry out its activities would generally
be able to use section 102 to exclude this income from tax.
22
See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 239 (1996) (discussing the
great similarity in particular between some large nonprofit organizations such as hospitals
and publicly traded companies); see also RICHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX
16 (1951).
16
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consideration must be to employ an entity tax like the corporate income tax.
Finally a focus on corporate tax rationales brings substantial complexity;
adding other rationales to the mix might lead to a lack of clarity. Thus, I
leave an examination of these other systems for another article. Because
mutual benefits so closely resemble cooperative organizations, a review of
cooperative taxation in connection with tax exemption might be particularly
fruitful.
This article is not about the charitable contribution deduction under
section 170 of the Code. This provision is related to one of the benefits of
some of the tax exempt organizations described in section 501(c) of the
Code, such as the charitable organizations described in section 501(c)(3).
The charitable contribution deduction has its own rationales that are distinct
from the consideration of whether to allow certain entities to operate
without paying tax upon their income.23
Part II briefly describes the tax exempt sector and the theories
regarding that sector. Part III provides a brief history of corporations and
their taxation in the United States. Part IV reviews the rationales for
imposing an income tax on corporations. Part V considers what corporate
tax rationales suggest about tax exemption for nonprofit organizations. The
article concludes with Part VI.
II. ORGANIZATIONS EXEMPT FROM FEDERAL INCOME TAX
A. Brief Description of the Tax Exempt Sector
Under section 501(a) of the Code, organizations described in sections
501(c), (d) (generally, nonprofit organizations), and 401(a) (pension plans)
of the Code are exempt from federal income tax   (“tax   exempt
organization”). This article focuses on tax exempt organizations described
in section 501(c). Tax exempt organizations under section 501(a) comprise
a diverse group: charitable organizations,24 social welfare organizations,25
social clubs,26 business leagues, and others all qualify within the section.27

23

See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309 (1972); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601 (2011); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable
Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of
Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989); David E. Pozen,
Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531 (2006).
24
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
25
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
26
I.R.C. § 501(c)(7).
27
I.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
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Tax exempt organizations aid the poor, operate hospitals, advocate for the
interests of members of business and labor, educate children and adults,
operate pools and athletic facilities, and manage museums. In 2009, tax
exempt organizations held over $4.3 trillion in assets.28 Tax exempt
organizations are typically formed as a corporation,29 although some are
formed as a trust, cooperative or unincorporated association. They are
unified   by   the   “non-distribution   constraint.”30 This means tax exempt
organizations may not distribute profits to owners.31 There is no constraint
on earning a profit, only one on distributing profits to owners.
Tax exemption provides exemption from income tax for income earned
by an organization while engaged in activities promoting the purpose of the
tax exemption.32 It does not generally exempt income from activities that
are   not   related   to   an   organization’s   exempt   purpose. A tax exempt
organization may lose tax exemption status if it operates for a substantial or
primary non-exempt purpose.33 For example, if a charitable organization
organized to relieve poverty adopted as a substantial purpose the operation
of a restaurant, it should lose tax exemption if the restaurant has little
connection to the exempt purpose of relieving poverty.34 Additionally, an
exempt organization is required to pay the unrelated business income tax
(UBIT) under sections 511–514 of the Code if it earns a profit from an
activity unrelated to its exempt purpose. The unrelated business income tax
generally does not apply to investment income or other sources of primarily
passive income.35
Tax exemption, if it is a subsidy, provides a financial benefit equal to
the  applicable  tax  rate  multiplied  by  an  organization’s  annual  income. 36 Of
28

KATIE L. ROEGER ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF:
PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 2 (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/412434-NonprofitAlmanacBrief2011.pdf. This amount may not include the
assets of organizations that do not file a return, such as churches.
29
See supra note 2.
30
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980).
31
Id.
32
I.R.C. § 501(c).
33
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008)  (“An  organization  will  
not be . . . regarded [as operating exclusively for one or more exempt purposes] if more than
an   insubstantial   part   of   its   activities   is   not   in   furtherance   of   an   exempt   purpose.”).  
Nonetheless, the actual point at which an organization should lose its exempt status, and not
just pay the unrelated business income tax, for failure to operate for an exempt purpose is
subject to much debate. See id.
34
See id.
35
See I.R.C. § 512(b).
36
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); see also
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course, if it is the case that tax exemption is such a subsidy, and this article
questions that assumption, it is only a subsidy to the extent that the
organization earns a profit during a taxable period. If a tax exempt
organization earns no income, it gains no financial benefit from tax
exemption. Thus, under a subsidy theory, a manager helps an organization
to benefit from tax exemption only if she saves the earnings of the firm for
a future year. Naturally, those organizations with greater financial resources
and thus opportunities to earn income in the year will reap a greater benefit
from the subsidy. An organization that earns $100,000 in income at a
constant 36 percent tax rate receives a subsidy of $36,000, while an
organization that earns $1,000,000 earns a $360,000 subsidy. Such a
subsidy is not connected to the positive values promoted by the
organization, but only to how much income the organization earns. Because
this article concludes that tax exemption for mutual benefit organizations is
a subsidy, this quality of tax exemption, giving greater benefit to those with
greater resources, seems an odd policy choice.
Scholars have attempted to categorize the tax exempt sector because of
the assortment of tax exempt organizations it encompasses. The most basic
distinction   made   is   between   “public   benefit”   and   “mutual   benefit”  
organizations.37 Public benefit organizations, as the name suggests, are
operated for the benefit of the public. Charitable organizations, for instance,
are considered public benefit organizations. A mutual benefit organization,
on the other hand, is operated for the benefit of its members.38 For example,
a beer league is operated for its members who are likely from a segment of
the beer industry. Boris Bittker and George Rahdert categorize charitable
organizations, social welfare organizations, and political parties as public
benefit organizations and categorize social clubs, cooperatives, labor
unions, and trade associations as mutual benefit organizations.39 Others
have recognized a similar dichotomy but labeled these main distinctions as
charitable and noncharitable.40
Henry Hansmann categorized nonprofit organizations based on revenue

Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,  461  U.S.  540,  544  (1997)  (“Both  tax  
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount  of  tax  it  would  have  to  pay  on  its  income.”).
37
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 268 (Walter W. Powell & Richard
Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
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source and control.41 Donative nonprofits receive the bulk of their revenue
via donations or grants. Commercial nonprofits, on the other hand, receive
the bulk of their revenue via sale of services or goods.42 Organizations
controlled by patrons obtaining services from the organization are deemed
mutual organizations. Organizations not controlled by patrons are
considered entrepreneurial organizations.43 These categories can be viewed
as a matrix. There might be a donative entrepreneurial, a donative mutual, a
commercial entrepreneurial or a commercial mutual.
Most scholars view tax exempt organizations as a sector of our
economy distinct from the for-profit and the government sectors.44 The forprofit sector provides control rights, profit rights, and ownership transfer
rights,45 whereas a democratic government sector provides the electorate
with ownership rights and control to elect representatives.46 In reality, these
distinctions are not so easy to make. After discussing tax exemption
rationales below, the following part addresses how for-profit corporations
grew directly from corporate bodies that initially started as government and
nonprofit corporate bodies.
B. Tax Exemption Rationales
What follows is a very brief consideration of exemption rationales. It is
brief as this is territory well covered in many articles and books.47
1.

Subsidy Theories

The prevailing theory continues to be that we provide tax exemption to
nonprofit organizations providing some benefit to the state that is at least
equal in value to the tax subsidy from the government.48 The theory
presumes that the state would normally tax all entities within its borders.
Thus, the state exercises legislative grace in exempting certain corporations
from tax. The Court  uses  the  subsidy  theory.  It  has  stated,  “Congress  sought  
to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the
41

Hansmann, supra note 30, at 841.
Id.
43
Id. Hansmann   defines   patrons   as   “all   persons   who   transact   with   a   firm   either   as  
purchasers   of   the   firm’s   products   or   as   sellers   to   the   firm   of   supplies,   labor,   or   factors of
production.”  HANSMANN, supra note 22, at 12.
44
Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
supra note 40, at 2.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See sources cited supra note 3.
48
Stone, supra note 3, at 45.
42
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development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or
supplement  or  take  the  place  of  public  institutions  of  the  same  kind.”49
There are a number of theorists who have used the subsidy theory. For
example, Burton Weisbrod argues that we subsidize the tax exempt sector
to solve government failure.50 Governments only provide public goods
desired by the median voter. Nonprofits can provide those public goods for
the voters outside the median and tax exemption serves as a subsidy to help
this good activity take place.51 Hansmann argues that the exemption
provides a subsidy to solve market-failure.52 Nonprofits tend to provide
services and goods in situations that make patrons hesitant to purchase
those service or goods because they believe managers are likely to shirk
their responsibility and will possibly abscond with money. For instance, a
donor is unable to determine whether the manager delivered charity to a
third party. The nondistribution constraint assures such donors that the
managers will not abscond with the money because they cannot make a
profit. We provide tax exemption as a crude subsidy to encourage the right
level of these efficient market providers.
Other subsidy exemption rationale scholarship focuses solely on
charitable organizations.53 Mark Hall and John Colombo focus on a
donation market to determine whether we should provide tax exemption to
charities. They argue, “the  primary  rationale  for  the  charitable  exemption  is  
to subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a substantial level of
donative   support   from   the   public.”54 Rob Atkinson suggests we should
provide tax exemption to public charities because they generate collective
goods and services that benefit the public and are deemed inherently
good.55 Atkinson argues that altruism is an inherently valuable meta-benefit
produced by nonprofits and therefore it deserves tax subsidization.56
Daniel Halperin questions whether tax exemption is a subsidy by
49

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); see also Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington,   461   U.S.   540,   544   (1997)   (“Both   tax  
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount  of  tax  it  would  have  to  pay  on  its  income.”).
50
Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a ThreeSector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE
AND POLICY 21, 22–24 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
51
BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 66–67 (1977).
52
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 67.
53
Altruism, supra note 3, at 510; Theories of Exemption, supra note 3, at 396;
Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 3, at 316; Donative Theory, supra note 3, at 1384.
54
Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 3, at 390.
55
Theories of Exemption, supra note 3, at 402–04.
56
Altruism, supra note 3, at 628–38.
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considering the normal income tax base.57 He concludes there is no subsidy
to charitable organizations associated with the exemption for contributions
and money earned from exempt related activities where those monies are
clearly used for direct spending on charitable purposes.58 Exemption for
capital investment and investment income, however, are subsidies because
exempting that income diverges from normal measurement of income
principals.59 Halperin examines mutual benefits as well and contends that
investment income and nonmember income is effectively a subsidy for
these organizations and should not be exempt.60 He argues, however, that
tax exemption for member income for organizations such as social clubs is
legitimate as it would not result in any substantial income.61
2.

Income Measurement Theory

Bittker and Rahdert believe that   public   service   organizations   “should  
be wholly exempted from income taxation, because they do not realize
‘income’   in   the   ordinary   sense   of   that   term   and   because,  even   if  they   did,  
there is no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the
beneficiaries   to   pay.”62 They conclude that these organizations cannot
easily measure their income.63 Based on the challenge in determining
income and the impact the tax would have on the less fortunate, they found
the exemption from income tax for charitable organizations to be justified
for all purposes.64 They  argue  that  “mutual  benefit”  organizations  should  be  
viewed as a conduit and that we should tax any income that could be
imputed to the members to the extent the entity earned investment income
and income from nonmembers.65 In other words, to the extent such an
organization earned investment income or earned money providing a
service or good to a nonmember, the members should be individually taxed
on their distributive share of income of the organization much like a
partnership. Bittker and Rahdert accept exemption to the extent a mutual
benefit earns income while its members are doing things they could do on

57

Exemptions a Subsidy, supra note 3; Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, supra note 3.
Exemptions a Subsidy, supra note 3, at 285.
59
Id. at 28586.
60
Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits supra note 3, at 135.
61
Id. at 135–36.
62
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305. Note that William Andrews seems to
similarly find this as a justification in part for the exemption. Andrews, supra note 23, at 360
(noting  the  “impracticality  of  measuring  individual  benefits . . . .”).
63
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 307.
64
Id. at 358.
65
Id.
58
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their own without being taxed.66 They argue it is impractical to collect what
they expect would be a minute amount of income.67
3.

Concluding Thoughts on Rationales

Tax exemption scholarship tends to focus on the exemption for
charitable organizations. The charitable sector is by far the largest of the
nonprofit sector. Additionally, there is significant diversity in the whole of
the tax exempt sector such that we may need a unique explanation for tax
exemption for each organization. Nonetheless, finding common traits could
help foster better rules for all of these organizations in the future. Along
these lines, tax exemption scholars seem to assume tax exemption is a
subsidy without critically examining this claim. None of the exemption
theories consider what rationale we would use to justify taxing nonprofit
organizations. Hansmann notes the oddity of taxing entities rather than
individuals, but states that since the corporate tax is so entrenched it makes
sense for purposes of his article to take the tax for granted.68 Thus, we are
left with a set of theories that are arguably not properly grounded. This
article contends that a rationale for why we might tax nonprofit
organizations is necessary to a more complete theory for a rationale of tax
exemption.
In the following part I provide a history of corporations and their
taxation in the United States. I believe this story helps in understanding the
rationale for taxing corporations.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS AND THEIR TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. History of Corporations
A corporation is a legal fiction that started as bodies of people serving
important public functions rather than serving the private for-profit function
that we typically envision of corporations in the United States today.
Nonprofit and for-profit corporations originate out of the same legal entity
form. This fact suggests that certain corporations may exist in a twilight
space between public and private where there may be an ambiguity in
whether an entity should be taxed by the sovereign.
66

Id. at 305.
Id. at 354–57. Such an issue is not a problem with respect to social clubs because
they are not able to exclude investment income and income from nonmembers from the
unrelated business income tax.
68
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 56.
67
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A corporation provides a fictional place in which multiple people can
own property in common and act together in some endeavor.69 William
Blackstone places the creation of companies with the Romans,70 where
publicani formed companies called Societates, in some instances to collect
taxes to pay for Roman conquest.71 According to Friedrich Carl von
Savigny, the first corporate bodies in Rome were villages, towns, and
colonies, and then gradually extended outward.72
In England, the country from which America adopted its corporate
legal   regime,   the   first   corporate   bodies   formed   as   “peace-guilds, the
members of which were pledged to stand by each other for mutual
protection.”73 From these peace guilds sprung municipalities and trade
guilds.74 These  trade  guilds  were  more  like  today’s  trade  unions,  protecting  
member interests, rather than seeking out economic innovation.75 The
substantial commercial corporations, still deeply connected to the crown,
began to form in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the
exploration of the new world.76 Companies such as the African Company,
the Russian Company, and the Company of Merchants of London formed in
the nature of these peace guilds to issue shares and pool money necessary
for complex and long-term financial endeavors for profit to the crown and
private interest.77 These types of corporations played a significant role in
the colonization of America.78 The Virginia Company, for instance,
introduced representative democracy into the colonies, while the
Massachusetts Company changed its stockholders (referred to as
“freemen”) into state citizens.79
Early in the history of the United States, the citizenry did not
69
See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 1–15 (2003).
70
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 456 (1765,
reprinted 1992); see also Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American
Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1 (1945).
71
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 69, at 4.
72
Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 105, 106 (1888), (citing 2 SYSTEM DE HEUTIGEN REUMISCHEN RECHTS § 86,
et. seq.).
73
Id. at 108 (citing LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS,
AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS (1870)).
74
Williston, supra note 72, at 108.
75
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 69, at 13.
76
Williston, supra note 72, at 109.
77
Id.
78
JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, 16 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 3 (1917).
79
MICKLETHWAIT &WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 69, at 34.
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distinguish between private and public corporations.80 Legal authorities
considered corporations either clerical or lay, and lay corporations were
considered either eleemosynary or civil.81 During the 18th century,
boroughs, universities, the Bank of England, and the East India Company,
along with insurance and manufacturing companies, were all categorized as
“civil.”82 Early Americans initially conceived of corporations as “agenc[ies]  
of government, endowed with public attributes, exclusive privileges and
political power, and designed  to  serve  a  social  function  for  the  state.”83
The earliest general incorporation statutes in the United States were for
religious congregations, educational institutions such as Harvard and
Dartmouth, libraries, charitable and beneficial societies, municipalities, and
agricultural societies.84 The earliest for-profit corporations in the United
States consisted primarily of public-minded infrastructure projects such as
turnpikes, bridges, canals, banks, and insurance companies.85 Although
modern for-profit corporations began development in the early part of the
19th century, it was not until around 1865, with the rise of railroad
corporations, that more significant corporations formed.86
Throughout the evolution of the corporation, scholars adopted three
distinct views regarding the personality of the corporation.87 Each of these
views becomes important in the corporate tax rationale, and is therefore
important to considering why we might (not) tax nonprofit organizations.
Originally,   corporations   were   thought   of   as   “artificial   entities”   existing  
solely as constructs of the state.88 As Chief Justice John  Marshall  said,  “[a]  
corporation is an artificial being . . . . Being the mere creature of the law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon   it.”89 The second view considers corporations as an aggregate of
80

Handlin & Handlin, supra note 70, at 19.
Id. at 20.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 22.
84
See generally RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION, 1784-1855: BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING
INDUSTRIALIZATION 9–32 (1982).
85
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 10 (1932).
86
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV.
999, 1012 (2010).
87
For a discussion of these theories, see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical
Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social
Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005).
88
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (discussing a
corporation  as  an  “artificial  being”).
89
Id.
81
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individuals having ownership of the entity acting on their behalf. This will
be  referred  to  as  the  “aggregate  theory.”  Finally,  as  for-profit corporations
grew well beyond the collective interest of their shareholders during the
Progressive   Era,   with   managers   controlling   corporations,   a   “real   entity”  
view became the prevailing theory.
B. History of Corporate Taxation
1.

The Beginning in the States

As corporations spread through the United States, individual states,
which relied largely upon property taxes for revenue, had to transition from
taxing tangible property to taxing intangible property.90 Because
corporations made capital more movable, they made the taxation of
property more challenging.91 As discussed by Steven Bank, these
challenges sparked an evolution towards a general corporate tax beginning
with property tax and special industry tax regimes.92 Initially, states
attempted to treat corporations no differently than individuals in their
property tax regimes.93 Yet this effort met with little success.94 States also
tried special industry taxes for businesses such as banks, insurance
companies, railroads, and transportation companies.95 These special
industry taxes applied to any business entity conducting that special
business, but typically these industries almost all conducted business as
corporations.96 Special industry taxes ultimately began to morph into
general taxes upon corporations, as happened in Pennsylvania.97
2.

Federal Taxation of Corporations

The United States began to tax corporations at the federal level in
earnest in 1864 as a component of the income tax enacted by the Union.
The Civil War income tax taxed shareholders on the profits of the
90

BANK, supra note 8, at 1.
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 136 (6th ed. 1909).
92
BANK, supra note 8, at 3-11.
93
Id. at 8.
94
R. RUDY HIGGENS-EVENSON, THE PRICE OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC SERVICES, TAXATION,
AND THE AMERICAN CORPORATE STATE, 1877 TO 1929 13–14 (2003).
95
BANK, supra note 8, at 9.
96
Id. at 10.
97
SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 166. The Pennsylvania corporate tax provided that
“‘banks  and  all  corporations  whatever’  which  declared  a  dividend  of  one  per  cent  should  pay  
‘in  addition  to  all  present  taxes’  one-half mill for each dollar of the dividend or profit, and an
additional one-half  mill  for  every  additional  one  per  cent  of  dividend.” Id.
91
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corporations whether distributed or not,98 and imposed a separate entity tax
on the earnings of special industries such as banks, insurance companies,
and transportation companies.99 The public apparently viewed these special
industry taxes as a withholding tax on corporations to enforce the individual
income tax on dividends received.100 Although the system effectively
operated as a conduit system whereby the corporation was essentially the
collection mechanism for taxing shareholders on dividends, Bank contends
that this tax presented the seeds of the modern corporate tax.101 Even then,
the federal government determined that the tax did not apply to all
corporations   subject   to   its   influence   by   exempting   “literary,   scientific,   or
other charitable institutions” from the ambit of the tax.102
After Congress let the income tax of the Civil War expire in 1872,103 it
was not until 1909 that Congress again enacted a corporate entity tax by
enacting an excise tax on the income of all corporations.104 The tax
consisted of one percent of the net income of the corporation in excess of
$5000.105 The Act additionally required corporations with income in excess
of $5000 to file a return that became a public record.106 Much in the way
the public viewed the Civil War tax on corporations as a conduit system
intended to tax the earnings of a corporate shareholders, the public
primarily viewed the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax as a tax on shareholders
and a substitute for an income tax.107 In that regard, in addition to limiting
its effect primarily to larger corporations, Congress again exempted certain
corporations from this tax regime; exempted entities included organizations
such   as   “labor,   agricultural   or   horticultural   organizations, . . . fraternal
beneficiary societies, . . . domestic   building   and   loan   associations,”   and  
those  corporations  or  associations  “organized  and  operated  exclusively  for  
religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of

98

BANK, supra note 8, at 13–14.
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223, 283–84 (1864); BANK,
supra note 8, at 15.
100
FREDERIC C . HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM 1791-1895 96–97 (1896) (discussing the implementation of
“stoppage  at  the  source”  principles);;  BANK, supra note 8, at 19.
101
BANK, supra note 8, at 14.
102
GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 275 (1863).
103
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1954).
104
Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
105
Id.
106
Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 116.
107
BANK, supra note 8, at 56–57.
99
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which  inures  to  the  benefit  of  any  private  stockholder  or  individual.”108
Although the public primarily viewed the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax
as a tax on shareholders,109 Marjorie Kornhauser has demonstrated that
many proponents of the excise tax also viewed it as serving a regulatory
function  to  reign  in  the  excess  of  the  “trust”  problem. 110 Arising during the
Progressive  Era,  the  “trust”  problem  involved  large  corporations  combining  
and defrauding investors by overcapitalization, along with monopolization
and the destruction of individual enterprise.111 Part of the solution to this
“trust”   problem   was   believed   to   be   publicity   of  corporate  information   and  
supervision.112 Kornhauser marshals evidence that the excise   taxes’  
proponents consistently highlighted regulatory functions of the tax.113 For
instance, President William Howard Taft stated that if the tax was enacted,
“we   [will]   have   made   a   long   step   toward   that   supervisory   control   of  
corporations which may prevent   a   further   abuse   of   power.”114 The
reformers focused their efforts on large corporations: the final bill, for
instance, exempted the first $5000 of income from corporation tax.115
Although the most explicit regulatory aspect of the bill, its publicity
function, was almost immediately eliminated after enactment,116
Kornhauser still maintains that the tax was a first moderate step toward
regulating corporate entities.117 With tax returns, the statute allowed the
federal government to collect data on corporations, thus beginning the
process of supervising corporate activity on a federal level.118
On February 3, 1913, Delaware ratified the 16th Amendment, the 36th
requisite state to do so, eliminating the potential constitutional infirmity of
an individual income tax. Congress quickly enacted an income tax on
October 3, 1913, as part of the Tariff Act of 1913, and with it a corporate

108

Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113.
BANK, supra note 8, at 5657.
110
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 56 (1991); see also Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of
Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective,
11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 536–38 (2010) (coming to similar conclusions regarding
the motivations of the proponents of the 1909 Corporate Excise tax).
111
Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 56.
112
Id. at 57.
113
44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909).
114
Id.
115
Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 106.
116
Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3), 36 Stat. 11, 114-15; see also Kornhauser, supra
note 110, at 132.
117
Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 134.
118
Id. at 134–35.
109
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income tax.119 Once more, Congress provided an exemption for those
organizations originally exempted from the Corporate Excise Tax of
1909.120 Additionally, Congress added new exempt organizations such as
social welfare organizations, chambers of commerce, and business
leagues.121
The  1913  income  tax  adopted  a  “normal  tax”  of  one  percent, applied to
both individuals and corporations.122 The statute allowed the deduction of
dividends  from  the  “normal  tax,”  such  that  this  income  tax  again  applied  a  
pass-through regime to corporate income;123 however, there was a wrinkle.
Congress imposed a surtax on incomes above $20,000 with a top rate of six
percent.124 Because the corporate rate was only one percent, shareholders
owing tax at the higher rates could leave earnings in the corporation where
the income would only be taxed at the lower one percent rate, providing an
opportunity for tax deferral. Congress attempted to lessen the deferral
opportunity   by   imposing   a   tax   on   the   “unreasonable   accumulations   of  
earnings”  of  corporations.125 This strategy proved ineffective and became a
constant irritant to progressive interests looking to see shareholder income
properly taxed.126
During the teens and twenties, Congress struggled with how to handle
the tax deferral problem caused by the rate differential between the
individual and corporate rates.127 This struggle led to the adoption of the
pure corporate entity tax that we know today. In the 1930s, based on a
public belief that undistributed corporate earnings were in part a cause of
the Great Depression, Congress passed an undistributed profits tax on
corporations at a twenty-seven percent rate, maintained the normal tax on
corporations with a top rate of fifteen percent, but, critically, eliminated the
individual dividend exemption from the normal tax.128 This was the fruition
of the movement toward the classical system of corporate taxation with a
tax on corporate income clearly separate and apart from individual
shareholders. Although businesses were quickly able to convince Congress
through lobbying efforts to remove the undistributed profits tax by 1939,
119

Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 16672.
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 172.
121
Id.
122
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166, 172.
123
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
124
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166.
125
BANK, supra note 8, at 85.
126
Id.
127
Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO.
L.J. 889, 926–27 (2006).
128
Revenue Act of 1936, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656.
120
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the double tax regime was in place.129
C. Concluding Thoughts on History of Corporations and Its Impact on
Nonprofits and Tax Exemption
The corporation as an idea is a fictional entity that plays a role in both
public and private spaces that has served to organize our cities, universities
and churches, and operated to facilitate our most complex private business.
Nonprofits present a tax challenge in this area as they occupy a twilight
space between the very clearly public and very clearly private. While we
seem to easily conclude that public entities such as states and
municipalities, all generally organized as corporations, are exempt from
federal income tax,130 and have a general sense that private for-profit
corporations should bear a tax of some sort in our income tax system, when
we start moving away from the clear public state-based activity we
encounter difficulty in categorization. In the relationship between
corporations and our society, we also see a struggle with the outsize impact
these organizations have on our citizenry and the opportunity they provide
to individuals for obtaining monetary advantages through their use. As
discussed above, the United States has used the corporate tax to attempt to
tax the wealth stored and utilized within corporations and to attempt to
regulate the activities of corporations. The following part assesses the
rationales for imposing the corporate income tax. The notion is that an
examination of this rationale might help to better define the twilight space
between what we conceive of as public space (nontaxable) and private
space (potentially taxable). Additionally this examination might shed some
light on why we may or may not think certain nonprofit entities are proper
subjects of taxation.
IV. WHY IMPOSE AN INCOME TAX ON CORPORATIONS?
Why impose a corporate income tax as a part of our income tax? I ask
this question because I assume the rationale for imposing the corporate
income tax should have some relationship to our rationale for exempting
certain corporations from that tax. Additionally, if the rationales do not
apply to tax exempt organization income, we need some other rationale for
imposing a tax or we cannot speak  of  exemption  from  tax  as  a  “subsidy”  in  

129

Bank, supra note 127, at 938.
For a discussion of the basis upon which state and local governments derive
exemption, see Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local Governments: The
Need for Congressional Action, 26 GA. L. REV. 421, 430–32 (1992).
130
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the way exemption is regularly conceived.131 If there is no rationale for
taxing these organizations, calling exemption a subsidy makes no sense. For
instance, although governmental entities are generally exempt from income
tax, no one talks of this exemption as a subsidy.
A. What is the Corporate Tax and Who Bears Its Burden?
What is the corporate income tax? The corporate income tax is
imposed under section 11 of the Code and applies to a legal entity that (1)
incorporates under the laws of a U.S. state, (2) allows its ownership
interests to be publicly traded, or (3) elects to be treated as a corporation.132
A corporation calculates its income similarly to the way the Code requires
an individual to calculate his income for tax purposes.133 Such similarities
include interest payments that are deductible134 and dividend payments that
are generally not. In turn, dividends are generally taxable to the person who
receives them. Because dividends are by definition the earnings and profits
of a corporation, the taxation of income at the corporate level combined
with the denial of a deduction for paid dividends leads people to label the
corporate tax a double tax. The income is taxed at the corporate level and
again at the shareholder level.135 These features of the current corporate
income tax steer many to conclude that the corporate tax system is not ideal
from an efficiency perspective.136 It leads to economic distortions because
131

See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the theories and court opinions adopting the
subsidy theory of tax exemption).
132
See I.R.C. § 7701 and the regulations thereunder. Nonprofit organizations organized
as corporations meet the requirements of (1) and thus the general rule regarding a nonprofit
corporation would be that it is taxed unless it meets one of the exemption requirements.
133
See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 4 (2009).
134
I.R.C. § 163(a).
135
If A forms a corporation by putting $100 into the corporation, he does so tax free to
himself and to the corporation. Assume the corporation borrows $900 at 5% simple interest
and must pay $45 to the lender in each year. After deducting salaries and interest payments
and depreciating its assets, the corporation earns $100 of taxable income in year 1. Assuming
a 35% tax rate, the corporation would pay $35 and have $65 to distribute to A. If the
corporation distributed the $65 to A at the end of the year, A would pay 15% of $65 ($9.75)
on the dividend received, leaving A with $55.25, for an effective tax rate of 44.75% on the
income earned in that corporation. In comparison, on the $45 of interest paid to the lender
during the year, the corporation deducts that amount, and the lender must pay ordinary rates
of only 35%. Thus, the holder of corporate equity bears a higher tax burden (44.75%) as
compared to the holder of corporate debt (35%) under this scenario. A also bears a higher
burden than if he carried on the same actions as a sole proprietor or partnership.
136
See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double Taxation: A Clash Over the Control
of Corporate Earnings, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 153 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds.,
2005).
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of the incentives to choose debt over equity in the corporate form and to
choose  other  entity  forms  over  corporations  because  of  the  “double  tax.”137
That we think of this corporate tax structure as a double tax intuitively
demonstrates the concept of the incidence of a tax. Because a corporation is
fictional we do not think of it as bearing a tax; rather, some human bears its
incidence. The corporate tax causes some human to have less wealth and
consequently a lesser ability to enjoy life. Describing the corporate tax as a
double tax thus illustrates that many intuitively believe that shareholders
bear the burden of the corporate income tax, i.e., shareholders of
corporations are believed to have a lesser ability to enjoy life as a result of
having to pay the corporate tax. Nevertheless, economists find the corporate
tax to be born by some combination of all holders of capital or perhaps
some significant portion of worldwide labor.138
B. Presumption Regarding Purpose of the Income Tax and Its
Connection to Corporations
There are two main questions regarding why we impose an income tax
on a corporate entity. The first focuses on why we impose a tax at the entity
level rather than tax the shareholders. The second asks why we impose both
an entity-level tax and an individual tax. This second question is often
thought   to   be   a   question   of   fairness   because   of   the   “double   tax”   on  
corporate income mentioned above. This article is concerned mostly with
the first question regarding why we might impose a tax on an entity because
of its relationship to the tax exempt organization, where we evaluate an
entity tax alone. Nevertheless, the second question regarding why there is a
“double   tax”   on   corporate   income   often   informs   the   debate   regarding   the  
corporate tax rationale. In reviewing corporate tax rationales, it is important
to keep this fact in mind because this feature of the corporate tax is not
particularly apposite to a tax exempt organization where there would only
be one level of tax.
Without getting caught up in the debate over the proper tax base, I note
that to consider the corporate tax rationales, we must also at least briefly
consider the rationale for the individual income tax. Why do we choose
income as a tax base? There are generally thought to be three primary
137

For a current consideration of all the efficiency problems associated with the
corporate tax, see SHAVIRO, supra note 133, at 25; see also Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX
NOTES 1767, 1768 (Sept. 27, 1999).
138
For an excellent review of debate regarding the incidence of the corporate tax, see
Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax?: A Review of What We Know (Nat’l  
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,686, 2005).
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criteria in evaluating a tax: equity, efficiency, and administrability.139 Much
has been written on each of these criteria but such a discussion is beyond
the scope of this article. I focus on the equity rationale as perhaps the most
important for the purpose of this article. The equity rationale refers to
whether the tax system is fair to individuals. In The Wealth of Nations,
Adam Smith set out the most common notion regarding equity as follows:
“[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to . . . the revenue which
they respectively enjoy . . . .”140 Today, this is commonly thought of as
ability to pay.141 While there is much debate as to whether ability to pay, a
benefit principle, or any other idea of distributive justice properly states a
coherent metric for considering equity,142 surely we adopt an income tax
base  as  a  measuring  device  to  assess  each  individual’s  level  of  welfare.143
Efficiency refers to the impact a particular tax imposes on an economy.
Administrability refers to the ease of administration of a tax. Although
these latter two factors are discussed below, each is secondary to the
question of equity for purposes of the income tax rationale.
If our income tax system goal is to measure some quantity of benefit or
ability to pay, imposing a tax on an entity such as a corporation is an
indirect way of accomplishing that goal. It makes it challenging to
determine who bears the burden of the tax, and it distorts the ability to pay
calculus. Thus, the question is set for why we impose a corporate income
tax. If we are genuinely interested in allocating the burden of government
among citizens according to ability to pay, choosing to impose the income
tax on corporate entities likely leads to some people overpaying and some
people underpaying. Additionally, if we have imposed a tax on the income
of a corporation, why are we additionally applying a tax on dividends
received by shareholders?

139

See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 100 (1990);
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 166
(1997).
140
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777–78 (1776).
141
JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 11 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
16th ed. 2012); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET PROPOSAL
6 (Comm. Print 2004).
142
See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 12 (2002) (extensive discussion of whether ability to pay or a benefit principle
presents a coherent theory of fairness); see also Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L.
REV. 867 (2002) (critiquing the ability to pay principle).
143
See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 142, at 20.
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C. Administrative  Convenience/That’s  Where  the  Money  Is
One reason we might tax the entity itself is administrative convenience.
Corporations provide a convenient place from which to collect tax — they
have money and they have the administrative capacity to easily deliver the
money to the government.144 This theory might garner support from a
political calculus. It is easier for a political system to adopt needed taxes if
there is a sense that no one is really being taxed. The government provides
important public goods, but might have trouble getting the citizenry to pay
enough money for the optimal level of those goods if they have to pay those
taxes in a way in that makes them believe they are being overburdened.
Because the corporate tax is not a particularly salient tax for the vast
majority of the voting population,145 if a legislator is looking for a way to
pay for the optimal level of public goods, the corporate tax could be a
useful tool in collecting the money for these goods.146 Using salience terms
coined by David Gamage and Darien Shanske, we could say that the
corporate   tax   lacks   “political   salience”   for   the   vast   majority   of the
population, that is, its imposition is unlikely to influence citizens to vote for
or against a politician because they are unlikely to be particularly aware of
the  corporate  tax.  We  could  also  say  that  it  lacks  “market  salience,”  because  
much of the population is likely not aware that they are paying the tax.147
This is not much of a justification for the tax from an equity
perspective if that equity perspective is based upon using income as the best
metric of ability to pay. The principal justification for this perspective is
that the State needs money and the corporate entity is an administratively
easy place from which to collect that money. Of course, if we do not adopt
the notion that fairness in taxation (and perhaps more broadly government
operation) must exist at the point of tax collection, and focus instead on
ultimate outcomes, we may not be bothered with the result of collecting
revenue through such a corporate tax.148

144

Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations? (Technical Comm. on Bus. Taxation,
Working Paper No. 96-2, 1996); SHAVIRO, supra note 133, at 11; see also GOODE, supra
note 22, at 26.
145
For a discussion of the burgeoning literature on the idea of salience and tax policy,
see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and
Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011).
146
See J. GREGORY BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE U.S. CORPORATION
INCOME TAX 7 (1980).
147
Gamage & Shanske, supra note 145, at 24–25.
148
See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 142, at 8 (arguing  “taxes  must  be  evaluated  
as  part  of  the  overall  system  of  property  rights  that  they  help  to  create.”).
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D. Aggregate Theory/Tax on the Shareholders
When the United States adopted a corporate income tax first during the
Civil War, then in 1909 and again in 1913, proponents supported it largely
because they believed it operated as a tax on wealthy shareholders.149 As
discussed above in reference to the history of taxation, the early versions of
the corporate tax effectively adopted a conduit system where the
corporation paid a tax, but it was thought of as a withholding system to
ensure payment from shareholders on dividends received. Although there is
now both an entity tax and a shareholder level tax, a primary justification
for the corporate tax remains that it is a tax on shareholder income. 150 The
theory arises from an aggregate view of the corporation: the corporation is
the property of its shareholders who are taxed based on their share of
corporate income through the corporate income tax.
What do we mean by the term shareholder? A shareholder owns a share
of stock in a corporation.151 As defined in a basic text on corporations, a
share  of  stock  is  “primarily  a  profit-sharing contract, a unit of interest in the
corporation  based  on  a  contribution  to  the  corporate  capital.”152 That profitsharing contract entitles the shareholder to three rights: (1) control, (2)
proprietary rights, and (3) certain ancillary and remedial rights.153 Under
the shareholder theory, we believe this profit sharing contract makes the
annual income of a corporation subject to the income tax. Shareholders with
these profit sharing contracts presumably have a greater ability to pay, and
therefore it is fair to include the   corporation’s   income   as   part   of   the   tax  
base.
A few problems arise with this theory. Corporate tax incidence
analyses suggest that the burden of the corporate tax is born by individuals
other than the actual corporate shareholders.154 Additionally, taxing
shareholders  on  corporate  income  before  they  have  “realized”  that  income  

149

See supra Part III.B.
SHAVIRO, supra note 133, at 23; Bird, supra note 144, at 9.
151
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 454 (1996); see Reid Thompson &
David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership 1 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., Institute For Law
and
Economics,
Working
Paper
No.
621,
2012),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177022 (discussing what it currently means to own a share of
stock and noting that title to most shares of stock today are held by Cede & Co. rather than
the individual who we think of as the owner).
152
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 13.01, at
718 (2d ed. 2003).
153
Id. § 13.01, at 718–19.
154
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1204.
150
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could be thought to violate the realization principle of our income tax.155
Finally, the tax rate applied to corporations bears no resemblance to the
rates we apply to individuals based on their income levels.156 Nonetheless,
there are practical reasons consistent with this aggregate shareholder view
that support tax at the corporate level. First, without the corporate tax,
shareholders could use a corporation as a tax deferral device. In other
words, if no tax applied to corporate income, individuals who controlled a
corporation could defer tax by leaving income within the corporation at a
zero percent tax rate annually. Such annual tax savings for owners of
corporate equity, as compared to owners of other business entities such as
partnerships whose income is taxed annually whether distributed or not,
would add up to significant amounts. Secondly, the administrative
convenience identified above may play at least a part in justifying a tax on
shareholders at the corporate level; given the massive number of
shareholders in modern public corporations, finding a means of determining
the distributive share of income and loss of each shareholder could be a
terrible logistical nightmare. Imposing a current income tax on the
corporation is a potential imperfect solution to that problem. Thus, the
shareholder theory, while not perfect, does at least provide some
satisfactory equitable and practical grounds for the corporate tax.
E. Real Entity/Regulatory Function
Some argue that the corporate tax regulates managers acting on behalf
of publicly traded entities.157 Publicly traded entities are defined by the
separation of ownership and control.158 As a result of this separation in
publicly traded corporations,   “important   decision   agents   do   not   bear   a  
substantial   share   of   the   wealth   effects   of   their   decisions.”159 Under these
circumstances managers may not act as the best agents of the
shareholders;160 also, managers of very large sources of wealth may act in
155

See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920).
Compare I.R.C. § 1, with I.R.C § 11.
157
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for Dividend Deduction,
65 TAX LAW. 3, 7 (2011); Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 61; see also Hideki Kanda & Saul
Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991)
(arguing that employing a separate corporate tax aligns the manager of the corporation as an
agent working in the tax interests of the shareholders).
158
See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 4; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
159
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983).
160
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 3.
156
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ways inconsistent with the good of the larger public.161 The corporate tax
arguably can act to rectify these problems. As discussed above, the enactors
of the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax thought the corporate tax would regulate
corporate managers.162 This view of the corporate tax takes a real entity
view, that is, we tax the corporation because we are trying to have an
impact on the behavior of the corporation.
Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that the separation of ownership and control
in publicly traded companies leads to significant power concentration in the
hands of a few: the corporate tax, he argues, serves as a check on that
corporate managerial power.163 Additionally, it affords the government a
tool to ensure the corporation acts broadly in the interests of shareholders
and the public.164 Avi-Yonah   states:   “the   corporate   tax   is   justified   as   a  
means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of
corporate management, which is inconsistent with a properly functioning
liberal democratic polity.”165 Avi-Yonah argues the corporate tax (1) limits
the amount of money a corporation manager has at her disposal to influence
the   political   process   (the   “limiting   function”),   and   (2)   provides   a   tool   to  
incentivize  or  discourage  a  corporate  manager’s  use  of corporate resources
(the  “incentive  function”).166
The limiting function is justified, Avi-Yonah contends, because
unreasonable accumulations of wealth are not healthy for a democracy.167
As Kay Lehman Scholzman, Sidney Verba and Henry Brady state,
“[a]mong  the requirements for a functioning democracy are mechanisms for
the free expression of political voice so that members of the public can
communicate information about their experiences, needs, and preferences
and hold public officials accountable for their conduct   in   office.”168 If
certain individuals amass vast amounts of wealth, this might so significantly
tilt the balance of political voice such that the democracy would be one in
name only.169 Given (1) the separation of ownership and control, (2) the

161

Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1243.
Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 53.
163
Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1225.
164
See GOODE, supra note 22, at 40; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1244.
165
Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1244–45.
166
Avi-Yonah refers to this latter function   as   the   “regulatory   function.”   Id. at 1246. I
have used a different term, the incentive function, to clarify it from the term it modifies.
167
Id. at 1244; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity,
and Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1412–13 (2002).
168
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL
VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2012).
169
Admittedly, the Court may not countenance this idea. Citizens United v. Fed.
Election   Comm’n,   558   U.S.   310,   349–50   (2010)   (“[T]he   concept   that   government   may  
162
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fact that corporations need not distribute earnings to its owners, and (3) that
there is power in control of large sources of money, Avi-Yonah argues that
it is essential to our democracy to assess a tax on corporations to limit the
power of these entities to ensure a more well-functioning democracy.170
The incentive function uses the tax system to incentivize the managers
of the entity to use its resources in a socially valuable manner, and to
discourage the managers from using the resources in a socially harmful
manner.171 For instance, Congress prohibits deductions for bribes paid to
foreign officials,172 and empirical research suggests this has had an impact
on the behavior of corporate managers.173 Avi-Yonah cites investment
incentives and incentives toward research and development as examples of
the types of devices Congress has used to incentivize managers to exercise
their resources in ways that are helpful to society.174
The regulatory justification of the corporate tax springs from a need to
justify taxing corporate income twice. Avi-Yonah believes that the only
appropriate place for this double level of taxation is with respect to publicly
traded corporations.175 He believes that taxing owners is sufficient for all
other businesses.176 The key to this argument for Avi-Yonah is the
separation of ownership and management.
Some question the regulatory function theory. Bank, for instance,
contends that even if the tax served a regulatory function, the tax fails in
fulfilling this function.177 Secondly, Bank claims that corporate managers
are likely able to shift the incidence of the tax such that the tax does not
impact   a   manager’s   behavior.178 It would be helpful if we had additional
empirical work to determine whether corporate taxation has a real
regulatory impact. Recent scholarship considers the relationship between
tax sheltering activity and corporate governance.179 As described by Mihir
Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala,   the   “basic   intuition   for   how   corporate  

restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others   is   wholly   foreign   to   the   First   Amendment”) (quoting United States v. Automobile
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 597 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
170
Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1244.
171
Id. at 1248–49.
172
I.R.C. § 162(c); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1248.
173
Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1248–49.
174
Id. at 1249.
175
Avi-Yonah & Chenchinski, supra note 157, at 7–8.
176
Id. at 8.
177
BANK, supra note 8, at xvii.
178
Id.
179
See generally MPA STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., COMPETITION & TAX LAW,
TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Wolfgang Schön et al. eds., 2008).
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governance and taxation interact is that tax avoidance demands complexity
and obfuscation to prevent detection. These characteristics, in turn, can
become  a  shield  for  managerial  opportunism.”180 In other words, efforts to
stamp out corporate tax avoidance may be complementary to establishing
good corporate governance such that the corporation is managed in the
interests of the shareholders rather than on behalf of the managers
themselves. There are some initial positive results to suggest a corporate tax
may positively impact corporate managerial behavior in such a way.181
Continued research in this area should be profitable.
Michael Doran argues that the regulatory justification seems to justify
taxing any large collection of wealth.182 In this regard, he argues that the
United   States   has   managed   to   “exert substantial public control over [the]
private concentrations of wealth . . . .”   of   pension   plans   and   charitable  
organizations without a tax.183 While there are limited taxes imposed on
pensions and other tax exempt organizations, as Doran notes, it is not clear
that   the   government   has   “exercised   substantial   public   control”   over   all  
private  concentrations  of  wealth.  This  article  does  not  quibble  with  Doran’s  
claim, but instead examines whether the regulatory theory should be
expanded to cover these other large concentrations of wealth, and if not,
whether the public control over these concentrations of wealth is an
effective substitute for the corporate tax.
Another critique contends that such a regulatory function at the federal
level violates principles of federalism. Corporate law is within the domain
of the states. When Congress debated the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax, many
argued vociferously against the publicity portion of the tax because it
encroached on state regulatory territory.184 In a modern context, James
Fishman recently argued, in part on federalism grounds, that the Service
lacks authority to regulate nonprofit corporate governance.185 Such
regulatory activity, in his opinion, should be left to the states. Of course, a
willingness to allow the federal government broad authority over corporate
governance through the Securities Exchange Commission would seem to
suggest that this federalism concern is not widely shared among the public,
at least with respect to publicly traded corporations.
180

Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax and Corporate Governance: An
Economic Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 179, at 13, 14.
181
Id. at 19–20.
182
Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L.
REV. 517, 530 n.47 (2009).
183
Id.
184
See Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 97.
185
James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s  Nonprofit  Corporate  Governance  
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 548–49 (2010).
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The regulatory theory could benefit from more empirical work
demonstrating its effectiveness. Given current rising levels of income186
and political voice187 inequalities, it seems to be in our interest to continue
exploring this function of the corporate tax. A tax that could both raise
revenue and direct the use of wealth toward more beneficial purposes, both
for the country and for shareholders, seems ideal. If it is in fact a tax that is
less salient on a market and political basis, it also seems ideal as a means
towards meeting our current long-term fiscal imbalance. On a final analysis
the regulatory theory of the corporate tax seems to offer some potential as a
real rationale for the corporate tax. While more work is needed in
considering its impact, it should not be thrown out simply because of
inconsistencies in its application or based on a simple determination that it
has not achieved its goal: we must also keep this regulatory function of the
corporate tax in mind when considering organizations we might determine
should be exempted from the corporate tax.
F. Artificial Entity/Benefits Theory
One theory claims the corporate tax is a charge for the benefits of the
rights to incorporation. The right to form a corporation is a valuable right
giving those who use it the ability to aggregate wealth for business purposes
and obtain limited liability. Under this benefits theory, individuals who use
such rights should pay a tax for those benefits. For example, when the Court
initially upheld the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, it referred to the tax as
“an   excise   upon   the   particular   privilege   of   doing   business   in   a   corporate  
capacity . . . .”188 Because many organizational forms — such as a limited
liability company, a limited partnership, or even S corporation tax status —
provide benefits like those of a corporation without application of an entity
tax, the benefits claim lacks a coherent rationale. At the same time, Rebecca
Rudnick argues the tax could be consideration in exchange for the
opportunity to sell equity on a public market.189 Under this theory, the
separate corporate income tax is justified only on corporations with access
to a public equity market. This theory does provide a plausible basis for the
corporate tax as currently structured. Still, it is only a rationale that the
corporate tax possibly has grown to include. This article contends, however,
that it has less explanatory power from an intuitive or evidentiary basis than
186

See, e.g., Anthony B. Atkinson et al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 3 (2011).
187
See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 168.
188
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911).
189
Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 985–86 (1989).
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either the shareholder or regulatory rationales.
G. Bank’s Capital Lock-in Theory
Bank argues that we have a corporate tax in addition to a shareholder
tax because corporate managers preferred to maintain strong capital lock-in
features of a corporation.190 Capital lock-in refers to a feature of a business
entity that involves little pressure from owners to return equity.191
Organizations featuring substantial capital lock-in exhibit a greater
longevity than those without. Corporate law itself works to ensure that there
is little pressure on a corporation to return equity upon the request of a
shareholder. This distinguishes a corporation from a partnership, which
generally has to return equity upon request of a partner. If the United States
were to tax shareholders currently on their share of corporate income,
shareholders would put pressure on corporations to distribute dividends
sufficient to pay such taxes. Because corporate managers highly value
capital lock-in, they resist any efforts to impose such a flow-through tax
system.192
While  Bank’s  capital  lock-in theory is persuasive in its argument that
corporate managers work to maintain a separate entity tax in order to have a
more   powerful   entity   in   their   control,   Bank’s   theory   assumes   the   natural  
order for an income tax would be to tax the shareholders on corporate
income. Thus, Bank seems to accept the aggregate view that the corporate
tax is imposed to tax shareholders; however, he simply contends that
allowing corporate entities to maintain their capital in order to increase the
size and scope of their business trumps a possibly more equitable
arrangement. The reverse, i.e., applying a partnership-like flow-through
regime on corporations, would reduce corporate managerial power because
the managers would be forced to distribute money as dividends so that the
shareholders could pay taxes on their share of earnings.
Thus, for purposes of examining tax exemption, this benefits theory
seems more of a gloss on the shareholder rationale rather than its own
independent rationale. Nonetheless, these practical considerations of
managerial power working to maintain entity wealth through tax policy
could play a part in the story of why we have maintained tax exemption for
certain nonprofit entities and should be kept in mind as we examine tax
exemption rationales.
190

See Bank, supra note 127.
For a discussion of the idea and arguably positive role played by capital lock-in, see
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003).
192
See Bank, supra note 127.
191
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H. Odds and Ends
The theories discussed above ignore the fact that corporate tax applies
whether or not an entity has shareholders who can receive distributions.
Under the Code, a corporation includes a business entity organized under
federal, state, and federally recognized Indian tribe statutes referring to the
entity as a corporation or as incorporated.193 Yet the corporate tax is written
broadly, such that it could apply, and under certain circumstances does
apply, even when connected to a governmental entity.194 For instance, an
organization carrying out an essential governmental function with an
income that accrues to a state or political subdivision thereof is allowed to
exclude its income from the corporate tax under section 115 of the Code,
but must still file a corporate return (Form 1120) with the Service. Any
nonprofit organized as a corporation also meets this definition of an
organization subject to the corporate income tax. Thus, the suggestion that
the corporate income tax is a backstop to ensure that shareholders are
paying tax on earnings, or that it is serving a regulatory function for the
managers of publicly traded companies, does not explain the corporate
income tax as it applies to entities within our system.
We are thus left with a series of imperfect explanations for the
corporate income tax. The two most publicly accepted theories, both now
and at the times of enactment, continue to be the shareholder theory and the
regulatory theory. Given their imperfect explanatory nature, we cannot
expect these theories to provide a perfect means of assessing nonprofit
rationales. Nevertheless, they are the content we have for justifying the
193

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2012).
Although not strictly under consideration in this article, state, municipal entities and
entities connected with such governmental groups are also generally organized as
corporations. See Aprill, supra note 130, at 430–32 (discussing I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
14,407 (1935), where the Service concluded that although a corporation, a state
governmental entity is not a corporation for purposes of the Code); see also Ellen P. Aprill,
The Integral, the Essential, and the Instrumental: Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Governmental Affiliates, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 803 (1998) (discussing the tax status of this
vast and complex array of state and municipal governmental affiliates). Federal
instrumentalities are expressly excluded from the income tax too, via section 501(c)(1), but
there are plenty of challenging twilight organizations connected with the federal government
that are potentially subject to corporate income tax — for instance, consider the National
Railroad Retirement Investment Trust, which Congress exempted from tax under section
501(c)(28). The subtext of such an inclusion in a list of exempt organizations is that it could
be subject to the corporate income tax. The Railroad Retirement Trust is theoretically
subjected to the unrelated business income tax under sections 511–514 of the Code because
it is exempt from tax under section 501(a) because it is described in section 501(c). In other
words, this federally connected entity is at least in part arguably subjected to the corporate
income tax presumably because it is a corporation.
194
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corporate tax as an entity income tax. If these rationales do not support the
taxation of nonprofits as well, we either have to look for some other
rationale to support their taxation such that we can call tax exemption a
subsidy, or we can accept that tax exemption is not really a subsidy at all.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXEMPTION
A failure to consider corporate tax theories leaves our tax exemption
rationales incomplete.195 Because most tax exempt organizations would
face the corporate tax if not exempt,196 comparing rationales for applying a
corporate tax at the entity level should provide feedback information
regarding why we should exempt certain entities from that tax. Although
this article contends that the two significant theories that likely have the
most explanatory power with respect to the corporate tax are the
shareholder and regulatory theories, this part will analyze each of the other
theories. The focus however will be upon the former two theories. The
focus on the shareholder theory serves to highlight and question the
assumption of most rationales explaining that exemption serves as a
subsidy. The article concludes that it is likely not a subsidy for truly
charitable organizations. On the other hand, tax exemption is a subsidy for
mutual benefit organizations because these organizations have individuals
who are akin to shareholders, that is, individuals who control the
organization and can direct its benefits in their direction. The focus on the
regulatory theory highlights the fact that our exemption rationales ignore
the potential regulatory function that the corporate tax serves. The point
being that a choice to exempt is not just an exemption from an obligation to
pay revenue, but also an exemption from a regulatory regime.
A. Administrative  Convenience/That’s  Where  the  Money  Is
If we tax corporations because they have the money and organizational
means to easily pay a tax, then the assumption that tax exemption is a
subsidy that is commonly made is likely reasonable for almost all tax
exempt organizations. Such   a   “corporate   income   tax”   should   apply   to   all  
corporate entities including nonprofit corporate entities. Tax exempt
organizations hold substantial assets, earn significant revenue, and often
have the organizational means to pay the tax just like publicly traded

195

See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 133,  at  3  (“Look at one [article of the corporate tax]
without the others, and it is easy to draw myopic and inaccurate conclusions about the
overall landscape.”).
196
See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2.
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corporations.197 The tax should therefore apply to all except possibly small
nonprofit organizations under this theory. Thus, any determination to
exempt nonprofit organizations from this corporate income tax can be said
to be a subsidy because we would tax these organizations in the normal
course of this notion of the income tax. By exempting nonprofit
organizations we are relieving them from an obligation they would have in
the normal course of business of our country.
What might rules for tax exempt organizations look like under this
administrative convenience corporate tax rationale? The rationale might
suggest tax exemption only where revenue-neutral to the government. We
might require an organization to demonstrate that it lessens the burdens of
government.198 We might also impose a payout requirement as is imposed
on private foundations.199 Yet because this corporate rationale has little
justification other than ease of administration it could just as easily be used
to support tax exemption as a broad subsidy that Congress decides to grant
to particular organizations. Because this rationale has such little explanatory
value from an equity perspective, however, it provides little in the way of
guidance to tax exemption rationales.
B. Aggregate Theory/Tax is on Shareholders
Given the history of the corporate tax, the popular conceptions
regarding the tax, and the simple practical aspect of administering the
income tax, a major purpose of the corporate tax appears to be to tax
shareholders.200 Although this rationale suffers substantial imperfections, as
discussed in the notes above in Part IV.G, there are simply too many
practical realities of our income tax system that suggest our public common
intention in imposing corporate tax is to tax shareholders.
This aggregate theory of corporate taxation leaves taxing nonprofit
197

A significant amount of our economy is held and earned in nonprofit tax exempt
solution. According to the Service business master file numbers from 2010, as recorded by
the Urban Institute, organizations exempt under section 501(c), exclusive of those described
in section 501(c)(3), held over $1 trillion in assets and earned over $384 billion in revenue,
while those described in section 501(c)(3) held over $2.48 trillion in assets and earned over
$1.3 trillion in revenue. See Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, NAT’L
CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile1.
php?state=US (last visited July 5, 2013).
198
Robert Louthian & Amy Henchey, Lessening the Burdens of Government, in
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
(CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993 (1992), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb93.pdf.
199
See I.R.C. § 4942.
200
See discussion supra Part IV.G.
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entities on somewhat shaky ground. The shareholder rationale requires
shareholders — individuals who own shares in the corporation. By
definition, nonprofit organizations should have no such individuals. If a
nonprofit organization earns income in a year, to whom should we attribute
the earning of that income? If we were concerned about the realization
principle with respect to a for-profit corporation, we should be doubly
concerned with that principle with respect to a nonprofit organization.
There is no one to whom we can easily attribute the benefits and the
burdens of a nonprofit organization.
What does the shareholder rationale suggest about the rules for tax
exemption? The shareholder theory could lead to the simple conclusion that
we must exempt organizations that have no shareholders or individuals
equivalent to shareholders. Of course, the Code generally prohibits tax
exempt organizations from allowing earnings to inure to the benefit of
private shareholders or individuals,201 and there are also rules prohibiting
most of these organizations from benefitting only members.202 This simple
version of the shareholder theory supports a claim that tax exemption for
nonprofit organizations is not a subsidy as most theories on exemption
presume, but is instead the natural order for nonprofit organizations. The
income should only be taxed upon being realized by an individual.
Nevertheless, this assessment oversimplifies the shareholder theory
because it does not consider the broader practical justification for the
shareholder theory. The practical basis of the shareholder theory provides
that without a tax upon income within an entity on an annual basis, those
who obtain its earnings in the future have obtained tax deferral. The impact
of this practical corporate tax rationale on tax exemption depends on how
much emphasis we put on the practical component and how much we put
on the simple fact of ownership of shares leading to taxation. The
ownership feature is a strong component of the shareholder justification,
suggesting that we can tax corporate income currently because we are
taxing  the  earnings  of  each  shareholder  and  we  can  tax  each  shareholder’s  
share of income because of the control and right to earnings they have with
respect to the corporation. The practical justification is mostly implicated
where there are individuals who exhibit a similar ability to control via
voting on board members and who have a right to earnings.
Adopting the shareholder rationale with a strong ownership component
but a weak practical tax deferral justification suggests that our tax
exemption system should provide tax exemption to those entities where the
likelihood of individuals who might control the entity and direct its retained
201
202

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (4).
See, e.g., rules regarding operating as a business league under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
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earnings to themselves is low. I will refer to this as the   “shareholder  
rationale  requirements.”  These  shareholder  rationale  requirements  keep  the  
focus of the shareholder theory on the fact of ownership as leading to a
right to tax the entity, but are wary of the potential for tax deferral. The
potential for tax deferral is greatest where there is an individual who
controls the entity and who has the right to direct its earnings accordingly.
The rules applicable to charitable organizations that qualify as tax
exempt, because described in section 501(c)(3),203 impose requirements that
make it rather difficult to direct earnings toward an individual who controls
the organization. In addition to requiring such an organization to operate
exclusively for a charitable purpose, section 501(c)(3) directly prohibits the
distribution   of   earnings   “to   the   benefit   of   any   private   shareholder   or  
individual”  of  a  charitable  organization.204 In other words, it prohibits a big
part of what we consider to be ownership — the right to the earnings of an
entity. The regulations further provide that a charitable organization must
operate for the public interest, not private.205 Although by no means
foolproof, these requirements and others significantly constrain the ability
of individuals to use a charitable organization for their private purposes.
These rules require significant monitoring by the Service to ensure the
system is not abused; but the rules provide the Service bounds within which
it can police charities to prohibit the use of these organizations for personal
gain or even for general tax deferral purposes.
Thus, if our rationale for taxing a corporate entity is a desire to tax
shareholders, such a rationale does not pertain to a charitable organization.
Operated in an ideal manner, a charitable organization presents no
individuals approaching the status of a shareholder. Consequently, there is
no subsidy at all for truly charitable organizations. Because in the normal
course of taxation we would have no basis upon which to apply a tax to
such an organization, the state is giving the charitable organization nothing
by not taxing it. The state had no right, under a shareholder taxation theory
to tax a charitable organization in the first place.
The rules applicable to tax exempt mutual benefit organizations,
203
“Corporations,   and   any   community   chest,   fund,   or   foundation,   organized   and  
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . and which does not participate in, or
intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public  office.”  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
204
Id.
205
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).

HACKNEY.FORMATTED.5

138

9/9/2013 4:11 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 33:nnn

however, typically allow members to control the organization via voting,206
and those members are the primary recipients of the benefits of the
organization. I contend that mutual benefit organizations thus have a close
equivalent to shareholders. The shareholder theory of corporate taxation
with a strong ownership component and weak practical justification would
suggest that tax exemption for mutual benefits is a subsidy. Thus, whereas
the structure required of charitable organizations alone meets the
shareholder rationale requirements, mutual benefit organizations do not. To
justify exemption for mutual benefits we need a reason for providing a
subsidy.
To illustrate the argument regarding mutual benefits, consider a beer
league, exempt from income tax because described under section 501 of the
Code.207 A business league is formed specifically to promote the common
interests of the organization’s members.208 The members pay dues and
typically elect the board of directors and the directors in turn hire
management to run the operations.209 The managers provide the services
desired of the members as long as these are not particular services for
individuals, such as providing insurance to the members.210 The beer league
would most likely promote the business of selling beer, and would probably
advocate to legislative and executive authorities for laws and enforcement
of laws that are in the interest of the beer industry as a whole. Hansmann
refers  to  such  an  organization  as  a  “commercial  mutual”  because  it derives
its income from dues and it provides its services to the individuals who
control the organization.211
For simplicity, assume members pay $1 million in dues to the beer
league during the year. The league invests the money while it is not using it
and earns just $5000 in interest during the year. By the end of the year, it
spends $1,005,000 on carrying out the interests of the members. The $5000
is clearly earnings of the organization. Although the beer league does not
distribute the   $5000   in   interest   as   a   “dividend,” the expenditure of this
money on behalf of the members is the equivalent of a dividend in kind.
206

The members of a business league described under section 501(c)(6) generally vote
for the directors of the organization. See, e.g., John Francis Reilly et al., IRC 501(c)(6)
Organizations, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
K-1, K-10 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf.
207
I.R.C. §501(c)(6).
208
Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960); see also FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M.
MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 14.3 (2012).
209
Reilly et al., supra note 206, at K-10.
210
I.R.C. § 501(c)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960).
211
See discussion supra Part II.
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This dividend in kind goes untaxed both at the entity level and at the
recipient level.
Tax exemption allows beer distributors the right to establish a tax
exempt vehicle for supporting their interests in the future. In comparison, a
beer corporation will likely not sell its goods primarily to its shareholders.
Nonetheless, its shareholders vote on a board of directors, that is, they have
voting control, and they have a right to the earnings of the corporation. The
biggest distinction is that the beer league member does not have a share she
can sell. Yet the beer league member is not paying the price she might pay
to purchase a share entitling her to transfer the interest in the future. She is
paying the amount that will promote her interests currently and into some
time in the future. This article argues that the shareholder theory of the
corporate tax would require that the earnings of this beer league should bear
a burden of tax, like its for-profit corporate counterpart. Individuals control
the entity, receive its earnings, and defer what should be taxable gain. Thus
tax exemption for an organization like this beer league is a subsidy that
needs to be justified.
The critical point is that there may be two different levels of tax
exemption. The first is built upon the fact that there are no shareholders or
“owners”  of  the  entity,  and  charitable  organizations  meet this first level of
tax exemption. The latter must be built upon an argument that an
organization is providing some underprovided good or service that society
deems worthy of a subsidy. Whether a business league actually provides
such services or goods is certainly open to question.
Mutual benefits are much more likely to be benefitting wealthy
interests. It is difficult to establish and run a nonprofit and doing so takes
significant resources. Additionally, as discussed above, the potential
benefits of exemption naturally accrue in greater amounts to those with
significant resources. The tax benefit increases with greater income.
Generally those with greater wealth earn greater incomes. Thus, the current
regime likely increases the current growing income inequality and political
voice inequality in the United States.212
Perhaps responding to such basic concerns, in the late nineties, the
Clinton administration proposed imposing the unrelated business income
tax   on   a   business   league’s   net   investment   income.213 The idea was that
“such   organization   should   be   subject   to   tax   on   earnings   attributable   to  
amounts collected in excess of the amounts needed to fund current

212

See Atkinson et al., supra note 186, at 3–71; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 168.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 278–81
(Comm. Print 1999).
213
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operations   of   the   organization.”214 The proposal failed after a massive
business league lobbying attack. The Chamber of Commerce claimed the
plan   was   a   “stake   driven   at   the   very   heart   of   nonprofit   organizations.”215
The shareholder theory of the corporate tax provides support for the
adoption of this Clinton proposal. Most theorists who have considered tax
exemption for mutual benefit organizations generally conclude that at least
the investment income of these organizations should be taxed.216 Congress
already applies an investment income tax and a tax on nonmember income
from social clubs.217 It is time to at least apply an investment income tax on
most mutual benefit organizations.
Some argue for the exemption of income a mutual benefit earns from
members while providing member services that each member could do on
his own without being taxed.218 Bittker and Rahdert believe it generally
impractical to collect what they expect would be a minute amount of
income because the entities would simply zero out their income every
year.219 They argue that we should consider any amount in excess of cost as
simply an overcharge, and therefore not income at all.220 The shareholder
theory provides little direction regarding such an argument. The shareholder
theory as considered here simply suggests that to the extent individuals
control an entity and tend to direct its benefits their way it should be taxed.
This claim suggests that there is no income benefit at all on individuals who
pool their resources to accomplish some group aim.
Because tax exempt mutual benefits bear such a strong resemblance to
cooperatives, we could consider taxing tax exempt mutual benefits under
sub-chapter T of the Code.221 Under a cooperative regime, a corporate tax is
applied at the entity level, but the cooperative is allowed a deduction for
patronage dividends.222 The members of the cooperative pay tax on

214

Id. at 279.
Jacob M. Schlesinger, Clinton  Plan  to  Tax  Lobbyists’  Investment  Gains  Hits Home
in a Fury of Faxes, Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24 (quoting Bruce
Josten, Executive Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
216
See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3,   at   358   (“There   is   no   reason   to permit
[investment and nonmember] income . . . to escape taxation when acquired under the
umbrella  of  [a  mutual  benefit]  organization.”);;  see also Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, supra
note 3, at 135 (concluding   “consumer mutuals generally ought to be taxed at least on . . .
profits  from  dealing  with  nonmembers.”).
217
I.R.C. § 512(a)(3).
218
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305.
219
Id. at 357 (discussing this idea with respect to business leagues).
220
Id. at 348.
221
I.R.C. §§ 1381–88
222
I.R.C. §§ 1381–82.
215
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patronage dividends they receive.223 This article focuses on the implications
of the corporate tax, however, and will leave discussion of cooperative
taxation for another article. Nevertheless, we may prefer maintaining tax
exemption for mutual benefits that are used to impact the political process.
Many of the most-consequential tax exempt mutual benefits such as
business leagues, social welfare organizations, and labor organizations are
used in this manner. Tax exemption likely allows the government more
ability to demand public disclosure, and we may prefer public disclosure to
any marginal benefit that we obtain from the revenue associated with
member income.
To conclude, the shareholder theory of the corporate income tax would
only support tax on tax exempt organizations where those organizations
have individuals akin to shareholders. The rules regarding charitable
organizations when operating for charitable purposes appear to meet this
requirement. Mutual benefit tax exempt organizations arguably do not. Yet,
that is not the end of the analysis for either type of organization. As
demonstrated by the corporate tax rationales, the corporate tax has more
than one function. Other functions may provide an argument for or against
the taxation of tax exempts. A lack of ownership alone also seems an
insufficient criterion for tax exemption. Because of the potential for tax
deferral mischief through a tax exempt entity, further precautions such as
requiring some publicly useful purpose seem necessary.
C. Real Entity/Regulatory Function
No tax exemption theory considers that the corporate tax serves a
regulatory function. Yet, early proponents of the corporate tax intended for
the corporate tax to regulate the increasingly ubiquitous and politically
powerful corporation in the Progressive Era.224 Avi-Yonah makes the
modern case that the corporate tax still regulates publicly traded
corporations.225 Highlighting the separation of ownership and control found
in a publicly traded corporation, Avi-Yonah argues that corporate managers
control substantial sources of wealth226 and that taxation of large amounts
of wealth is needed to limit the political power of wealth in a democracy.227
The corporate tax provides that limiting function for publicly traded
corporations.228 Avi-Yonah also argues that the corporate tax provides a
223
224
225
226
227
228

I.R.C. § 1385.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1210.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1238–39.
Id. at 1243–44.

HACKNEY.FORMATTED.5

142

9/9/2013 4:11 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 33:nnn

tool for the government to direct the actions of managers toward desired
shareholder and public uses of resources.229 The Code imposes a regulatory
regime on tax exempt organizations. That regime primarily consists of
purpose requirements, prohibitions on self-dealing and politically related
activity, and required public disclosure. This article is a call to examine the
tradeoff in regulatory effects we make in moving an organization from
taxable status to tax exempt status, substituting one regulatory regime for
another.
Tax exempt organizations necessarily exhibit the separation of
ownership and control found in publicly traded entities.230 In other words,
because of the nondistribution constraint, the managers who control a
nonprofit organization do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects
of their decisions. Many managers of tax exempt organizations also manage
vast quantities of assets for the public benefit. The top ten charitable
organizations held assets of between $10 and $40 billion as of 2009.231 If it
is important in a democracy to limit the ability of a finite group of
individuals to control significant amounts of wealth, and the corporate tax
serves to limit this finite group, we should consider the impact of exempting
nonprofit organizations from the corporate tax. Following the logic of the
regulatory theory of the corporate tax, tax exempt organizations either need
that regulation or should be regulated by some other regime.
1.

Managerial Nonprofit Corporation Power/Avi-Yonah’s  Limiting
Function

According to the limiting function of the regulatory theory we should
tax entities where managers control an organization they do not own that
has some quantum of wealth and income.232 The limiting function is
necessary for a well-functioning democracy to prevent finite individuals
from   amassing   too   much   power.   By   “limiting   power   in   a   democracy,”   I  
mean limiting the power to elect certain candidates (political campaign
intervention), and to limit the power to influence our government actors
once in place (lobbying). Is there a need for such a limiting function within

229

Whether the corporate tax directs resources to a good use is highly questionable, but
the fact that the tax is imposed provides Congress such a tool through incentives and
limitations on deductions. See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 180, at 14 (discussing its
potential to aid in aligning managers with shareholder interests).
230
See Fama & Jensen, supra note 159.
231
See Largest Organizations, (NCCS Core 2010 Public Charities File), NAT’L CTR.
FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTopOrgs.php?cat=
ALL&amt=ass_eoy (last visited July 5, 2013).
232
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1246–47.
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the tax exempt sector?
The corporate tax is not the only means to prevent the harm to a
democracy from corporate managerial political power. Congress has
attempted to limit or ban expenditures in the political sphere.233 Such
limitations implicate freedom of speech and after Citizens United, however,
where the Court held unconstitutional a federal ban on corporate
independent   expenditures   on   “electioneering   communications”   or   for  
speech that expressly advocates for a candidate, such a strategy now seems
out of the question.234 Congress sometimes requires disclosure and
disclaimers.235 This type of regulation fared better under Citizens United.236
The Court expressly stated, “[t]he   Government   may   regulate   corporate  
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may
not  suppress  that  speech  altogether.”237 Congress has utilized each of these
solutions to some degree in the Code for the tax exempt sector.
A charitable organization is prohibited from engaging in lobbying as a
substantial part of its activities.238 It is absolutely prohibited from
intervening in a political campaign.239 Lobbying for charitable
organizations involves a complex analysis but in general involves attempts
to influence legislation,240 while intervening in a political campaign refers
to publicly advocating for or against a candidate for public office.241 Under
the Code, a tax applies to charitable organizations that engage in
233

See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and
Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 98 (2009) (discussing the history of the efforts of
Congress to limit political campaign intervention expenditures).
234
Citizens  United  v.  Fed.  Election  Comm’n,  558  U.S.  310,  367 (2010).
235
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts (BCRA) disclaimer and disclosure
requirements, BCRA §§ 201 and 311, 116 Stat. 88, 105, are examples of such efforts. See
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255 (2010) (discussing
the potential for disclosure to have a useful impact on regulating the political process); see
also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000); Ciara TorresSpelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy,
Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax Exempt Entities
Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP.
J.L. & POL’Y 59 (2011).
236
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50.
237
Id. at 319.
238
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
239
Id.
240
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008); see also I.R.C. § 501(h) and
the regulations thereunder.
241
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008); see also Rev. Rul. 2007-41,
2007-1 C.B. 1421.
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disqualifying lobbying,242 and another tax applies if a charitable
organization engages in political expenditures.243 Additionally, charitable
organizations are required to make an annual disclosure on Form 990,
Return of Organization Exempt from Tax.244 On this form, charities must
disclose a substantial amount of information regarding their activities
during the year including gross income, substantial donors, highest paid
employees, and all sorts of confirmations that their organization has been in
compliance with the requirements of section 501.245
Because of this substantial regime limiting the political involvement of
charities through a combination of prohibitions, limitations, taxes, and
public disclosure, it appears Congress has thoroughly handled the limiting
function portion of the regulatory function with respect to charitable
organizations. It is hard to imagine that imposing the corporate tax would
be needed for the limiting function on top of this regime. The one caution is
that after Citizens United these limitations focused on prohibiting
communication are in question.246 In Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington, the Court accepted congressional tax
limitations on lobbying tax exempt organizations primarily because the
Court viewed tax exemption as a subsidy.247 Ironically, the analysis of this
article arguing that tax exemption is not a subsidy for charitable
organizations, at least under a shareholder theory analysis, would take some
weight away from the Regan decision. Congress, however, still may be
subsidizing charitable organizations through the charitable contribution
deduction.248

242

I.R.C. § 4912.
I.R.C. § 4955.
244
This information return is required by I.R.C. § 6033.
245
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). On the political campaign intervention prohibition, Part IV,
question 3 of Form 990 asks, “Did   the   organization   engage   in   direct   or   indirect   political  
campaign   activities   on   behalf   of   or   in   opposition   to   candidates   for   public   office?”   On  
lobbying, Part IV, question 4 of Form 990 asks, “Did  the  organization  engage  in  lobbying  
activities,  or  have  a  section  501(h)  election  in  effect  during  the  tax  year?”
246
For articles considering the impact of Citizens United on the constitutionality of
these types of limitations, see Aprill, supra note 3; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities
and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407
(2011).
247
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
There  is  some  thought  that  Justice  Blackmun’s  concurrence  in  Regan is equally as important.
Justice Blackmun believed that the only thing that rescued the limitation on lobbying was the
fact that a section 501(c)(3) organization could establish a section 501(c)(4) organization to
lobby on its behalf. 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Aprill, supra note 3,
at 5–6 (discussing the importance of Justice Blackmun’s concurrence).
248
See I.R.C. § 170.
243
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Political limitations on mutual benefit organizations are much less
substantial. For instance, social welfare organizations,249 labor
organizations,250 and business leagues251 all may engage in lobbying as
their sole activity, 252 and may also intervene in a political campaign as long
as it is not the primary activity of the organization.253 To the extent a tax
exempt organization engages in political intervention, a tax is imposed on
the lesser of its investment income or the amount spent on political
activity.254 It is possible though to avoid this tax by setting up a segregated
fund for all funds to be used for politicking.255 An  organization  “organized  
and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting
contributions or making expenditures or both . . . ” for political intervention
is instead described in section 527 of the Code, assuming the organization
follows the requirements of that section.256 Under section 527, an
organization’s   income   from   political   contributions,   dues,   political   fundraising events or sales, and bingo games is exempt from taxation.257 A tax
is applied generally on the net investment income, but it is apparently fairly
easy to structure the organization so it pays little if any tax.258 Mutual
benefit organizations must also file a Form 990 and disclose substantive
information regarding their activities, although that form has a much more
substantial focus on the activities of charitable organizations.
Social welfare organizations are very often used to lobby and are
attacked in the news for being engaged in too much political activity.259

249

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1 (1997).
251
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960).
252
See John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and
Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, in INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 206, at L-1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopicl03.pdf; see also Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117; Aprill, supra note 3, at
375.
253
Petition from Democracy 21 and the Campaign Legal Center, to Douglas H.
Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.
democracy21.org/uploads/D21_and_CLC_Petition_to_IRS_7_27_2011.pdf (asking that the
Service revise section 501(c)(4) regulations to state that a social welfare organization must
operate  “exclusively”  for  social  welfare  purposes  rather  than  just  “primarily”).
254
I.R.C. § 527(f).
255
I.R.C. § 527(f)(3).
256
I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
257
I.R.C. § 527(e).
258
I.R.C. § 527(b); see Aprill, supra note 3, at 51.
259
For   instance,   Karl   Rove’s   Crossroads   GPS   is   notably   an   organization  described   in  
section 501(c)(4). ProPublica has invested significant resources looking at the use of social
welfare organizations to influence the political process. See Kim Barker, Karl  Rove’s  Dark  
250
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Crossroads GPS, for instance, the social welfare organization Karl Rove
helped form and lead, had spent $70.9 million on the 2012 federal elections
as of December 7, 2012, mostly on behalf of Republican Party candidates
and causes.260 The Planned Parenthood Action Fund, LLC, to include a
Democratic leaning organization as well, spent over $6 million on the 2012
federal elections.261 Business leagues also play a role in the political
process. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for instance, spent over $33
million on the 2012 federal elections.262 The Associated Builders and
Contractors, Inc. spent $280,000 on the elections.263
Given the separation of management and control and the substantial
wealth of these organizations, the rationale for applying the limiting
function of the corporate tax should apply to mutual benefit organizations.
Additionally, the limitations on the political use of mutual benefits are not
substantial in the way they are for charitable organizations. Thus, if you
accept the need for the limiting function then either the certain additional
limitations should be imposed on charitable organizations, or a tax should
be placed on the income of these organizations. There are a number of
proposals arguing for either greater disclosure or greater limitations on how
much political activity in which these organizations engage.264

Money Group Promised IRS It Would   Spend   ‘Limited’   Money   on   Elections, PROPUBLICA
(Dec. 14, 2012, 11:19 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/what-karl-roves-dark-moneynonprofit-told-the-irs. The money contributed to social welfare organizations for political
purposes   has   come   to   be   referred   to   as   “dark   money”   because   these   organizations   are   not  
required to disclose the names of donors from whom they ultimately received their money.
See Barker, supra note 6.
260
Al Shaw & Kim Barker, What and Where are the Super-PACs Spending?,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2012), http://projects.propublica.org/pactrack/#committee=all (last
updated Dec. 7, 2012).
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
The DISCLOSE Act of 2012, sponsored by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, would
amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for additional disclosure from
corporations, labor unions, and other organizations when they make an “independent  
expenditure”   effectively   advocating   for   a   candidate.   See Democracy is Strengthened by
Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2012, S.3369, 112th Cong. (2012); see also
Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the
Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427 (2011) (calling for disclosure of contributions to
certain tax exempt organizations for political action on a rapid basis); Greg Colvin, A Silver
Bullet that Would End Secret Tax Exempt Money in Elections, CAMPAIGN FOR ’AM.’S
FUTURE BLOG (April 11, 2012), http://blog.ourfuture.org/20120411/A_Silver_Bullet_That
_Would_End_Secret_Tax-Exempt_Money_in_Elections (proposing a cap on political
intervention spending by any organization organized under section 501(c) of the lesser of
$100,000 or 10% of expenditures).
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Thus, ironically, a business that the corporate tax is supposed to
regulate may put money aside in a mutual benefit organization, a tax-free
vehicle, to defend its interests in the future. These membership dues are
generally deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
section 162 of the Code. While not deductible if for political or lobbying
purposes,265 the investments can grow tax free. Such a subsidy allowing
special industries the ability to save tax free in the same way we allow
individuals to save for retirement, health care expenses, or education seems
questionable. It allows a larger business a greater subsidy based on greater
return from greater assets and essentially entrenches long-term power for a
larger industry. The limiting function of the corporate tax should be
extended to these organizations. This is a good reason to reconsider at least
the exemption on investment income from UBIT for organizations
described in section 501(c)(6), and possibly, given their significant use
these days for political purposes, organizations described in section
501(c)(4).266
2.

Manager Incentive Alignment/Avi-Yonah’s  Incentive  Function

The corporate income tax also serves an incentive function.267 This
function provides Congress with a tool to direct managerial behavior in
ways that will be beneficial to the shareholders of a company and to the
general public. If the corporate tax indeed can incentivize managers to use
resources in a manner more consistent with shareholders and the public, it
would stand to reason that we should consider whether this is a better tool
for regulating tax exempt entities as well.
The Code imposes requirements on tax exempt organizations
encouraging them to use their assets in ways that are in the interest of the
organizations’   respective   constituents   and   the   public   at   large.   Charitable  
organizations must be organized and operated exclusively for a charitable
purpose.268 Mutual benefit organizations likewise must generally operate
exclusively or primarily for their particular exempt purpose.269 A social
welfare organization, for instance, must operate exclusively for social

265

I.R.C. § 162(e).
Notably, we already impose this obligation on social clubs, and where a business
league or social welfare organization extends its activities such that it is engaged directly in
intervening in a political campaign on a primary basis, it becomes a political organization
described in section 527 and is thereby subject to taxes on its net investment income.
267
See supra Part IV.F.
268
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
269
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6).
266
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welfare purposes.270 With the charitable sector, the Service requires
substantial disclosure about an organization on its Form 990 including some
on the governance of the organization. The Service also expresses publicly
that it believes part of its function is to regulate the governance of the
sector.271 Charitable and social welfare organizations are subject to
limitations   on   the   amount   of   “private   benefit”   they   can   provide   to  
individuals,272 and are also subject to a tax that effectively polices selfdealing transactions.273
Nevertheless, by exempting organizations from tax Congress gives up a
tool in taxation to positively or negatively incentivize nonprofit
organization managers towards certain behavior. With the current structure
governing tax exempt  organizations,  Congress’s  almost  exclusive  tool  is  to  
penalize such organizations to try to encourage ideal managerial behavior.
For instance, if a charitable organization fails to operate for an exempt
purpose, the Service can revoke its exemption and make the organization
subject to the income tax. A hospital that does not to comply with a
charitable needs assessment requirement should theoretically lose its
exemption.274 Congress has tried to alleviate this problem of revoking

270

I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
Sarah Hall Ingram, Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, Internal
Revenue Service, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal
Education: Nonprofit Governance  The View from the IRS (June 23, 2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ingram__gtown__governance_062309.pdf (“[T]he  IRS  has  a  
clear, unambiguous role to play in governance. Some have argued that we do not need to be
involved, because we can count on the states to do their job and the sector to stay on the path
of self-regulation. . . . we cannot delegate to others our obligation to enforce the conditions
of  federal  tax  exemption.”).
272
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008)  (“An  organization  is  not  
organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in subdivision (i)
of this subparagraph   unless   it   serves   a   public   rather   than   a   private   interest.”);;   see Am.
Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989); Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
47 (1966) (organization provided too much private benefit by maintaining a navigable
waterway mostly for the private use of the homes fronting the waterway and thus was not
operated primarily for a charitable purpose). For its application to social welfare
organizations, see Vision Serv. Plan v. United States, 265 Fed. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2008)
(finding a vision services health maintenance organization not to be organized for social
welfare because it “benefits [the organization]’s subscribers rather than the general welfare
of the community.”); Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488
F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1973), (membership organization of plumbers that repaired potholes of
streets only its members had an obligation to repair found to not be operated for a social
welfare   purpose   because   “each   individual member receives far more in economic terms
precisely to the extent he uses the restoration service.”).
273
I.R.C. § 4958.
274
I.R.C. § 501(r).
271

HACKNEY.FORMATTED.5

2013]

9/9/2013 4:11 PM

What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption

149

exemption as the primary penalty for missteps to allow the Service more
flexibility in enforcing the requirements for tax exempt organizations. For
instance, it enacted section 4958 to apply to the self-dealing acts of insiders
of charitable and social welfare organizations. This provides a more
modulated penalty and one that applies to malfeasors rather than the
organization, but the Service still must enforce a penalty.
Congress could consider revising exemption such that a tax applies
unless the organization complies with a particular requirement. For
instance, an organization might be required to pay an income tax unless it
can demonstrate that it in fact accomplished exempt purposes during the
year. This might look a bit like a payout requirement under section 4942
that already applies to private foundations. Instead of pulling the exempt
status of an organization that fails to meet the payout requirement, however,
we could simply apply a tax on the organization. If the organization meets
the required amount of expenditures on its charitable purposes in a future
year, it would not owe a tax.
Intuitively it seems harder to employ penalties upon managers to
incentivize good behavior, rather than to use taxes with certain deductible
and nondeductible expenses. Arguably, the nondeductibility of foreign
bribes serves as a more immediate disincentive to engaging in bribery than
trying to penalize a manager once caught. One could also consider making
credits more available to exempt organizations in the way the small
employer health insurance tax credit has been made available to exempt
organizations under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.275 The
message here is that a choice to exempt organizations comes with a loss of
power over these organizations in seeking out certain desirable behaviors.
Some object to the federal government regulating both the for-profit
and the nonprofit corporate sectors. Fishman, for instance, objects to the
Service engaging in regulating the governance policies of charitable
organizations.276 He contends that this is not within the bounds of the
federal   government’s   authority.277 Others have considered the proper role
of the different authorities, including asking whether there should be some
other federal agency that regulates charitable organizations.278 Some have
275

I.R.C. § 45R; see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SMALL BUSINESS HEALTH CARE TAX
CREDIT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: WHO GETS THE TAX CREDIT, http://www.irs.gov/uac/
Small-Business-Health-Care-Tax-Credit-Questions-and-Answers:-Who-Gets-the-Tax-Credit
(last updated Jan. 24, 2013) (explaining that the credit is available to tax exempt
organizations).
276
Fishman, supra note 185.
277
Id.
278
Id.; Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence:
Focus   on   Independent   Stakeholders   as   a   “Middle   Way”, 99 KY. L.J. 731 (2011); Lloyd
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argued that even within the tax exempt sector there is less need for
regulation of mutual benefits because the membership structures of those
organizations should ensure proper operation.279
Because there is already regulation of for-profit organizations
effectively taking place within the Code as a result of the imposition of the
income tax, considering the use of the income tax as a means for regulating
tax exempt organizations with a bit more precision seems fully within
Congress’s  power.  As  more  empirical  work  is  needed  to  determine  whether  
corporate tax regulatory efforts actually work, the same is needed for
nonprofit organizations. Finally, while mutual benefit organizations may
have membership structures that ensure a closer affinity to such
organization’s   primary   constituents,   its   members, than perhaps one can
achieve through a charitable organization management structure, we have
no reason to think that somehow mutual benefits would not present the
same agency issues that lead to a concern regarding managerial behavior in
publicly traded corporations. The same separation of ownership and control
exists leading to a challenging agent/principal problem.
D. Artificial Entity/Benefits Theory
The artificial entity theory in its original form held that nonprofit
corporations should be subject to the corporate income tax to pay for the
benefit of operating in the corporate form. The modern version of this
rationale, however, holds that the tax is imposed on publicly traded entities
in exchange for their ability to sell equity on public markets.280 Thus, this
theory does not support a tax on nonprofit organizations; nonprofits are
absolutely prohibited from selling equity on a public market. If this is the
main theory for applying a corporate income tax, which as noted before
seems questionable, then there is no subsidy to tax exempt organizations.
E. Bank’s  Capital  Lock-in Theory
This article excluded capital lock-in theory as an independent equity
based rationale of the corporate income tax. Capital lock-in theory contends
that our current corporate tax system exists because corporate managers did
not want to be forced to distribute dividends. If Congress converted the

Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010).
279
See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 890 (2003).
280
Of course, this is not the way the tax is applied. It is applied on any organization
organized as a C corp. that does not elect S corp. status.
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corporate tax to a conduit system like a partnership tax, shareholders would
place significant pressure on corporate managers to pay dividends so that
the shareholders could pay the taxes on corporate income. This would harm
the capital lock-in feature of a corporation and lead to a less efficient and
powerful business. The theory assumes shareholders should be taxed and
that the entity tax is imposed in lieu of imposing a conduit system. Except
to the extent capital lock-in reinforces the shareholder theory as the basis of
the corporate tax, this artifact of our corporate tax history appears mostly
useless in considering tax exemption.
Nonetheless, the behavior of corporate managers to uphold capital
lock-in by maintaining a corporate tax system that many of its shareholders
consider unfair could be instructive for the tax exempt sector. Nonprofit
organizations are also typically corporations and they cannot distribute
earnings. This is a capital lock-in policy that allows the tax exempt sector to
grow without having to worry about paying out investors. Presumably a
charity’s   distributions   should   be   for   its   charitable   purpose and, arguably,
some in the charitable sector do not expend enough annually for that
purpose.   Congress’s   imposition   of   payout   requirements   on   charitable  
organizations such as supporting organizations and private foundations
suggests that Congress has been concerned about such behavior.281 Thus, it
might be fruitful to consider whether the managers of exempt organizations
have behaved like managers of for-profit corporations.
F. Place for Theories Regarding Exemption
The contention of this article is fairly narrow. It argues simply that we
must understand why we would tax tax exempt entities in order to
understand what makes an organization tax exempt. In considering a
number of limitations on tax exempt organizations, the Court placed great
importance on the fact that exemption is a subsidy.282 Thus, shedding more
light on whether we have a rationale for taxing these entities is important.
The contributions of Hansmann and Weisbrod on government failure
and market failure, respectively, are important insights that provide strong
explanatory reasons for the existence of the sector and efficiency bases for
exempting the sector.283 Both authors also support the absence of owners,
281

I.R.C. §§ 509(a), 4942.
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); see also
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.  540,  544  (1997)  (“Both  tax  
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.”).
283
See supra Part II.B.
282
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or “shareholders”   in   tax exempt organizations.284 Rather than focusing
explicitly on any tax rationale, however, their rationale focuses primarily on
the market, identifying these organizations as the most efficient provider of
some good or service.285 This article contends that the tax rationale has an
important role to play in the analysis of the question of ownership, and in
assessing the potential importance of regulating the sector. Understanding
why we would tax an organization to begin with has very specific
implications for how exemption should be structured. As a review of
corporate tax rationales demonstrates, there may be multiple rationales for
the imposition of a corporate tax and each rationale causes us to think
slightly differently about the meaning of “tax exemption.”
The search for positive qualities of the charitable sector has been a
useful endeavor. We have better vocabulary and political justifications for
exempting charitable organizations as a result. Nevertheless, an obsessive
focus on charitable organizations leaves out a whole realm of organizations
that also have an important impact on our society and need a justification
for their tax status. More tax scholarship is needed on the mutual benefit
sector. The Tea Party scandal demands it. This article argues that many
mutual benefits likely have members that are equivalent to shareholders and
therefore should likely face some greater tax burden than they currently
face. Additionally, because these organizations often manage significant
sources of wealth, they could potentially benefit from the regulatory
function of the corporate tax. We could benefit from a closer analysis of the
mutual benefit sector to determine if it might behave in greater public
interest with a tax on net investment income along with greater disclosure
regarding their donors.
V. CONCLUSION
This article considered the rationales for exempting nonprofit
organizations from income tax by considering why we impose a corporate
income tax in the first place. Because so many theories for the rationale for
tax exemption rely on a premise that tax exemption is a subsidy, this article
asserts that we must have a legitimate basis for calling tax exemption a
subsidy. In order to call it a subsidy we must have a rationale for why we
would impose an income tax on these nonprofit organizations in the first
place. Two reasons stand out: (1) to tax shareholders, and (2) to regulate
corporate managers. Adopting the shareholder theory suggests that if an
284

See supra Part II.B. For both Weisbrod and Hansmann, the nondistribution
constraint is critical to these organizations efficient functioning within our
governmental/market system.
285
See supra Part II.B.
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organization has individuals who have significant attributes of ownership
similar to a shareholder, we have a strong rationale to impose an entity tax
on that organization. Thus, we could conclude under this rationale that tax
exemption for charitable organizations, which have no individuals
resembling shareholders, is not a subsidy; however, tax exemption for
mutual benefit organizations, which have individuals that resemble
shareholders, is in fact a subsidy. Because there are only tepid rationales
providing a basis for a subsidy to such mutual benefit organizations, this
article contends we should reconsider tax exemption for mutual benefits. At
the very least, we should tax their net investment income, as has been
proposed for business leagues in the past and as we already apply to tax
exempt social clubs. Such a move might be a means to take some of the
pressure off the Service in making a call as to whether one of these mutual
benefit organizations is too political. Adopting the regulatory theory
suggests that when we choose to exempt nonprofit organizations we must
recognize the loss of the two regulatory functions of the corporate tax: the
limiting function, and incentive function. Substantial disclosure
requirements and limitations on the political activity of charitable
organizations make the corporate tax as regulatory device unnecessary as to
charitable organizations. Yet the same cannot be said for mutual benefit
organizations. The corporate regulatory tax rationale thus offer another
reason to reconsider the current tax exempt structure for mutual benefits.

